Das Ritter Telegramm

The following post is a fuller translation of “The Ritter Telegram” from Bavarian Documents to the Outbreak of War and the Versailles Verdict, on behalf of the Bavarian State Parliament, ed. by Dr. P. Dirr; from the 1924 edition (p. 206).

“Das Ritter Telegramm”

“Der bayerische Gesandte beim Vatikan, Herr von Ritter, sandte am 24. Juli 1914 folgende Chiffredepesche an die Münchener Regierung:

Telegramm Nr. 216. Rom, den 24. Juli 1914, 18 Uhr 35 Min.

Papst billigt scharfes Vorgehen Österreichs gegen Serbien und schätzt im Kriegsfalle mit Rußland russische und französische Armee nicht hoch ein. Kardinalsekretär hofft ebenfalls, daß Österreich diesmal durchhält und wüßte nicht, wan es sonst noch Krieg führen wollte, wenn es nicht einmal eine ausländische Agitation, die zum Morde Thronfolgers geführt hat und außerdem bei jetziger Konstellation Österreichs Existenz gefährdet, entschlossen ist, mit den Waffen zurückzuweisen. Daraus spricht auch die große Angst der Kurie vor dem Panslavismus.

Ritter.”

{The Pope} {approves} {sharp/harsh} {proceedings/action/approach} {Austria} {against} {Serbia} {and} {estimates} {in the} {event of war} {with} {Russia} {Russian} {and} {French} {army} {not} {high} {one}. {Cardinal Secretary} {hopes} {likewise}, {that} {Austria} {this time}

{holds out/perseveres} {and} {intuited} {not}, {when} {it} {at other time} {still} {war} {conduct} {want/desire} {if} {it} {not} {once} {a} {foreign} {agitation}, {the} {to} {murder} {heir apparent/Archduke} {led} {has} {and} {in addition/as well} {at} {of present}

{political situation} {Austria’s} {existence} {endangered/threatened} {determined} {is}, {with} {the} {arms/weapons}

{must reject/point back to/repel}. {From this} {speaks} {also} {the} {great} {fear} {the} {curia} {before} {the} {Pan-Slavism}.

{Ritter}.

FULL TRANSLATION:

The Bavarian Envoy to the Vatican, Herr von Ritter, sent the following encrypted telegram to the Munich Government on 24 July 1914:

Telegram No. 216, Rome, 24 July 1914, 18 H 35 min.

The Pope approves of Austria’s harsh treatment of Serbia. He has no great opinion of the armies of Russia and France in the event of war. The Cardinal Secretary of State hopes likewise that this time Austria will hold firm; and intuited that he could not see a more desirable time for Austria to make war if she does not do so now in the face of such foreign agitation, which has led to the murder of the Archduke and also to the present political situation which threatens Austria’s very existence - unless she determines to repel this threat by force of arms. Also, from my discussions: it is evident that the great fear amongst the Roman Curia is that of Pan-Slavism.

Ritter.

“Drang nach osten”: Germany’s drive to the East

(Above: front cover of H Charles Woods' The Danger Zone: Changes and Problems in the Near East, 1911; and below: the title-page of his later work The Cradle of the War: The Near East and Pan-Germanism, 1918).

This post continues on from the theme of the previous post from February concerning the conflict between the “King of the Earth” (Germany and the Central Powers) and the “Kings of the East” (or “sun-rising”: the British Empire with its “jewel in the crown” centered on India).

First from a work I cited from in a post from last year (in the Archive for May 2010 on the World War Armageddon blog):

‘Let us now review our position, and see how we stand with regard to the events which we have shown to be foretold as destined to take place during the era of the sixth Vial in which we are now living. The drying up of the Euphrates has long been going on: the power of Turkey has long been declining. Our statesmen tell us “The Sick Man is sicker than ever.” In our daily papers we read: “The Ottoman Empire exhibits all the signs of a state in dissolution.”. . . Those evil agencies symbolised by the three frog-like spirits, which are yet to embroil the world, have began to show signs of increased activity. No one can deny that there is in the minds of thinking men, whose eyes are open to see the signs of the times, a presentiment that a great crises is approaching in the history of our world. There ever lingers on the horizon the dark storm-cloud of the Eastern Question. Now and again it seems gathering to a head, and threatening to burst. But, as often happens in thundery weather, the storm is averted for a while. Yet there the cloud is still, waiting for the time fixed by God's eternal decree, and when that time comes the cloud of the Eastern Question will once more gather and come down, involving the nations in widespread calamity and destruction. There can be little doubt that in the crises of the end of this dispensation the Eastern Question will play its part.’

(The Rev. Joseph Tanner, B.A.; from: Daniel and the Revelation: The Chart of Prophecy and our Place in it; A Study of the Historical and Futurist Interpretation; London; Hodder and Stoughton, 1898; p. 370).

Before moving on to quote from the latter work detailed above by H Charles Henry, the following quote is taken from H A Gibbons' The Reconstruction of Poland and the Near East, 1917 (pp. 57-58):

“Hemmed in on the west by Great Britain and France and on the east by Russia, born too late to extend their political sovereignty over vast colonial domains, and unable (if only for lack of coaling stations) to develop sea power greater than that of their rivals, nothing was more natural than the German and Austro-Hungarian conception of a Drang nach Osten through the Balkan Peninsula, over the bridge of Constantinople, into the markets of Asia. The geographical position of the Central European states made as inevitable a penetration policy into the Balkans and Turkey as the geographical position of England made inevitable the development of an overseas empire.”

(As cited in, Turkey, The Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway: A Study in Imperialism; by Edward Mead Earle, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of History in Columbia University; The Macmillan Company, New York, 1924; p. 51).

Now to H Charles Woods' work:

‘[First:] the reasons which have prompted me to call this book “The Cradle of the War.” For many years, and more especially since the re-establishment of the Ottoman Constitution in 1908, the numerous problems connected with the Near East have been a source of continual danger to the world's peace. This was due in part to the fact that the Balkan Peninsula and Asia Minor might at any time be the scenes of insurrection, massacre, or local conflict, and in part — a larger part — to the international rivalry which has existed for years concerning a future domination over many of the areas in question.

‘These localities, together with the waterways which they control, form the great and only corridor from west to east and from north to south, and they constitute the natural highway from Central Europe to Asia and from Russia to the Mediterranean. Thus, ever since the birth of her Mittel-Europa scheme, Germany has been determined to push open the Near-Eastern door, in order to be able to strike a deadly blow at the very vitals of the British Empire, and at the same time automatically to prevent Russia from expanding towards warm water. As I shall endeavour to show, therefore, it is not so much the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his Consort at Serajevo on June 28, 1914, as the developments preceding and following that occurrence which make the Near East the region of primary existence of the present conflict — the area in which many of its most important events have been sheltered and nurtured.

‘In the manner that a little cot is made ready for the expected child, so did the enemy prepare for the war which he was designing. This preparation, in progress from the time of the accession of the present [German] Emperor to the throne in 1888, was carried out by the gradual development of Germanic influence and power in Turkey, and by a constant and determined opposition to the establishment of stable conditions in the Near East. From the moment of the birth of his war child, too, the Kaiser has been an ever vigilant mother, for instead of allowing the real primary cause of the world conflict to be forgotten, he has consistently rocked the “cradle” in the apparent hope that she who performs this task rules the world.’

(From the Preface to The Cradle of the War: The Near East and Pan-Germanism; published: Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 1918; pp. ix-x).

‘Whilst the policies of England and Russia during the thirty years following the signature of the Treaty of Berlin may be described as those of procrastination, the Central Powers and particularly Germany were working and intriguing for the maintenance of a state of unrest in the East destined to prepare the way for the eventual realisation of their policies. Indeed, ever since the accession of the present Emperor to the throne in 1888 that rider has been carefully developing his influence in the East. One year later, and in 1889, His Majesty paid his first visit to Constantinople — a visit more or less connected with the then recent grabbing of the Scutari-Ismid railway and with the concession for the prolongation of that line to Angora as a German concern. Directly afterwards, early in 1890, by the “Dropping of the Pilot” there was in the retirement of Bismarck a clear reversal of the policy based upon the assertions of that statesman to the effect that the whole Eastern question was “not worth the bones of a Pomeranian Grenadier.” Before and particularly after the appointment of Baron Marshal von Bieberstein, who had then been a personal friend of the Kaiser's for many years, as Ambassador in Constantinople in 1897, Germanic policy was run with the sole object of securing concessions in and gaining the favour of Turkey. Indeed although so far as the Balkan States were concerned the Kaiser at this time endeavoured to screen his intentions behind a nominally Austrian programme, he was really preparing the way for the realisation of his Pan-German dreams in the Near and Middle Easts. Thus the power of Von der Goltz Pasha, who introduced the present military system into Turkey in 1886, and of his pupils was greatly increased until the Ottoman army was finally completely under Germanic control.’ (ibid. pp. 5-6)

And on a chapter on “Mittel Europa” H Charles Woods writes:

‘I have already dealt . . . with the question of German intrigues in the East prior to the out break of the War, that I propose here only briefly to refer to one or two points raised in the “Revelations of Prince Lichnowsky”, published in pamphlet form by The New York Times. To begin with, no doubt whatever is left upon the mind of the reader that Germany, and not Austria, made this War, largely with the object of improving her position in the East. Indeed from the time of the Congress of Berlin of 1878, when Prince Lichnowsky says his country began the Triple Alliance Policy, “The goal of our [German] political ambition was to dominate in the Bosphorus”, and “instead of encouraging a powerful development in the Balkan States, we [Germany] placed ourselves on the side of the Turkish and Magyar oppressors.”

‘These words contain in essence and in tabulated form an explanation of the Pan-German policy in progress during the period covered by this book — a policy the existence of which has often been refuted and denied by those who refused to see that, from the first, the Kaiser was obsessed by a desire for domination from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf. What is even more striking, too, is the fact that, in speaking of the Balkan War period, Prince Lichnowsky says, that “two possibilities for settling the question remained.” Either Germany left the Near-Eastern problem to the peoples themselves or she supported her allies “and carried out a Triple Alliance policy in the East, thereby giving up the rôle of mediator.” Once more, in the words of the Prince himself, “The German Foreign Office very much preferred the latter,” and as a result supported Austria . . .’ (ibid. pp. 312-313).

And from the same chapter concerning the “attention with which the Germans have developed their plans for conquest in the East”, H Charles Woods quotes the following:

‘ “Their objective,” as President Wilson said in his address delivered at Baltimore on April 6, 1918, “is undoubtedly to make all the Slavic peoples, all the free and ambitious nations of the Balkan Peninsula, all the lands that Turkey has dominated and misruled, subject to their will and ambition and build upon that dominion an empire of force upon which they fancy that they can erect an empire of gain and commercial supremacy, — an empire as hostile to the Americas as to the Europe which it will overawe, — an empire which will ultimately master Persia, India, and the peoples of the Far East.” ’ (ibid. p. 320).

* * * * * * *

Envoi:

‘The war has been forced upon us, and yet we must look upon it as a stroke of good fortune that the sacrificial death of Archduke Francis Ferdinand led to the premature outbreak of the great anti-German conspiracy. Two years later the war would have been far more difficult, its victims more numerous, and its outcome less certain.’

(Paul Rohrbach, Professor of Colonial Economy in the Commercial Academy of Berlin, writing in the Author’s Preface to his Germany’s Isolation: An Exposition of the Economic Causes of the Great War, 1915).

And again:

‘Must [we] not fight for two hundred fifty million pounds of commerce.’ (Paul Rohrbach, quoting from the Saturday Review article ‘England and Germany’ (September, 1897) in his German World Policies, (p. 181), as cited in The Anglo-German Commercial and Colonial Rivalry as a Cause of The Great War; by Oscar Albert Marti, M.A.; The Stratford Company, Publishers, 1917; p. xiii).

The battle lines were joined:

‘[T]he merchants of Tarshish, with all the young lions thereof, shall say unto thee, Art thou come to take a spoil? hast thou gathered thy company to take a prey? to carry away silver and gold, to take away cattle and goods, to take a great spoil?’ Ezekiel 38:13

(For other posts on the “Kings of the East” click on the link in the Index below).

Unholy Smoke & Fire: Austria v Italy

SMOKE

BEGINNING WITH CARDINAL MANNING'S PRONOUNCEMENT ON THE 'ONE SOLUTION' TO THE 'DIFFICULTY' OF THE POPE'S LOSS OF HIS TEMPORAL POWER:

'There is only one solution of the difficulty, a solution, I fear impending, and that is, the terrible scourge of Continental war, a war which will exceed the horrors of any of the wars of the first Empire. And it is my firm conviction that, in spite of all obstacles, the Vicar of Jesus Christ will be put again in his own rightful place. But that day will not be until his adversaries will have crushed each other with mutual destruction.' (The Tablet, January 24, 1874).

Later the same year of Manning's pronouncement, W. E. Gladstone wrote the following in Appendix C to his Vatican Decrees:

'Compare the recent and ominous forecasting of the future European policy of the British Crown in an Article from a Romish Periodical for the current month, which has direct relation to these matters, and which has every appearance of proceeding from authority.

'“Surely in any European complication, such as may any day arise, nay, such as must ere long arise, from the natural gravitation of the forces, which are for the moment kept in check and truce by the necessity of preparation for their inevitable collision, it may very well be that the future prosperity of England may be staked in the struggle, and that the side which she may take may be determined, not either by justice or interest, but by a passionate resolve to keep up the Italian Kingdom at any hazard.” - The 'Month' for November, 1874: 'Mr. Gladstone's Durham Letter,' p. 265.'

(From: The Vatican Decrees In Their Bearing on Civil Allegiance: A Political Expostulation, by the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M.P.; published London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, 1874; p. 32).

Some years later, reflecting on Cardinal Manning's pronouncement, the Rev. Hugh Price Hughes, Editor of the Methodist Times, gave the following insight into his utterance - in the issue of August 6th, 1896, he wrote:

'I was simply horrified at the calmness with which he declared that he would be willing to deluge the whole of Europe with blood in order to destroy the unity of Italy and recover the temporal power of the Pope. He also expressed a conviction that the German Empire was very insecure, and would probably be shattered in the course of the great war which he prophesied would destroy both the unity of Germany and the unity of Italy, in order to restore the Pope to the throne of Rome.'

(As cited in the Protestant Truth Society publication: Is Rome behind the War? by J. A. Kensit, 1918; p. 13).

And in his The Papal Conquest (1909) the Rev. Alexander Robertson, D.D., recounted the following:

'Some few years ago, here in Venice, I had much pleasant intercourse with Dr. Andrew D. White of Cornell University, and late Ambassador at Berlin of the United States of America. Speaking together one day of the Hague Conference of 1899, at which he sat as President of the American Delegation, he told me the following incident. The Conference had finished its work, and he was bidding farewell to the “House in the Wood,” when he found at its door, in a towering passion, a leading Roman Catholic diplomat who represented one of the great Catholic Powers. Dr. White said to him : “Step into my carriage, and drive home with me to dinner and unburden your mind.” He did so. The cause of his wrath was as follows :–

'When the Conference was being arranged for, the Pope claimed, as the world knows, to be represented at it, not only as a temporal sovereign, but as the world's great peace-maker, the representative on earth of the Prince of Peace. He moved heaven and earth to enforce his claim; but of course it was rejected without discussion, as the very idea of such a thing was out of the question. Had it been entertained, Italy would have refused to enter the Conference, and England, and probably other powers, would have done the same; hence the Conference would necessarily have been given up. However, at the closing meeting of the Conference, as Dr. White said, “to the amazement of all, and almost to the stupefaction of many,” M. de Staal, the representative of the Netherlands, handed a paper to the Secretary to read. It turned out to be a letter from his Queen to the Pope, in which she indicated that it was not the fault of her Government that he was not represented at the Conference. The paper also contained the Pope's reply, in which he magnified his office as the world's peace-maker, and reiterated his incontestable right as such to be represented. It was the Pope's letter with its mendacious statements and preposterous claims that roused the anger of this Roman Catholic Delegate, who, once seated in the carriage, delivered himself as follows (and now I am quoting, not from memory, but from Dr. White's Autobiography which he has just sent me) :–

'“The Vatican has always been, and is to-day, a storm-centre. The Pope and his advisers have never hesitated to urge on war, no matter how bloody, when the slightest of their ordinary worldly purposes could be served by it. The great religious wars of Europe were entirely stirred up and egged on by them; and, as everybody knows, the Pope did everything to prevent the signing of the treaty of Münster, which put an end to the dreadful Thirty Years' War, even going so far as to declare the oaths taken by the plenipotentiaries at that Congress of no effect. All through the Middle Ages and at the Renaissance period the Popes kept Italy in turmoil and bloodshed for their own family and territorial advantages, and they kept all Europe in turmoil, for two centuries after the Reformation—in fact, just as long as they could—in the wars of religion. They did everything they could to stir up the war between Austria and Prussia in 1866, thinking that Austria, a Catholic power, was sure to win; and then everything possible to stir up the war of France against Prussia in 1870, in order to accomplish the same purpose of checking German Protestantism; and now they are doing all they can to arouse hatred, even to deluge Italy in blood, in the vain attempt to recover the Temporal Power, though they must know that they could not hold it for any length of time even if they should obtain it. . . . Their whole policy is based on stirring up hatred and promoting conflicts from which they hope to draw worldly advantage. In view of all this, one stands amazed at the cool statements of the Vatican letter.”' [Autobiography of Dr. D. White, vol. ii. pp. 349-351 (The Papal Conquest, pp. 313-316).]

FIRE

CONCLUDING WITH COUNT CARLO SFORZA'S TESTIMONY AS TO THE REALITY OF THE INTRIGUE:

'Leo XIII . . . dreamed of the destruction of Italian unity which, he thought, should be dissolved into a federation of little Italian republics under the presidency of the Pope. He dreamed of a departure from Rome [and establishing himself in his “cara Salisburgo” – his dear Salzburg – awaiting the crusade of the Catholic powers] followed by a triumphal return after a victorious war waged by Austria-Hungary against Italy – an idea that Francis Joseph had the good sense to reject. . . .

'Italy and the world remained long in ignorance of these intrigues; in fact, they became known only in 1919 when, through an initiative that I myself undertook [whilst Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs], republican Austria consented to open to us the archives of the Empire for all sorts of historical researches.'

(From: Contemporary Italy: Its Intellectual and Moral Origins; Count Carlo Sforza; Frederick Muller Ltd., London, 1946; p. 69).

* * * * * *

The following is from Chapter XV of the same work, where Count Sforza recounts the realities of Italy's 'FOREIGN POLICY':

'Italy being engaged in a war with Turkey in 1911, Conrad, the Austro-Hungarian Chief of Staff, put all his influence in Vienna to work in order to gain the old Emperor's consent for a “preventive war” against Italy. Aerenthal did not hesitate to define Conrad's projects “a policy of brigandage,” and Francis Joseph sided with his Minister of Foreign Affairs. Conrad resigned, but continued to preach his great plan among his close friends.

'In the course of his recriminations, Conrad added that Austria should have seized a former opportunity that chance had offered her against Italy, that is, the tragic days of the Messina earthquake. Conrad's intimates and his protector, Archduke Francis Ferdinand, have on several occasions admitted it.

'Conrad's ideas must have appeared to the initiated not far from realization, since the German Ambassador at Rome at that time dared send the Consulta this communication: that it was well understood that in the event of an Austro-Hungarian war with Italy, Germany would remain neutral, the treaty of the Triple Alliance being mute on that hypothesis!

'Proof of the hardiness of myths agreeable to a nation's vanity, these facts, historically certain, have not prevented and will not prevent sentimental German writers from continuing to cast doubts on Italy's loyalty during the period of the Triple Alliance. The truth is that the meticulous study of the diplomatic documents of the period will only demonstrate that if in that mariage de raison which was the Triple Alliance there were thoughts and acts of dubious fidelity, they were chiefly on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The fact is explicable when one recalls that, as regards Italy, the treaty had no positive aims but was entered into for negative reasons. Italy understood that she could not live under the constant menace of a neighbour who detested her by tradition and necessity. (Did we not represent that principle of nationality so hated in Vienna?) Italy felt in her very flesh the spear point of the Trentino, the menace of that powerful and malevolent neighbour; she knew she could expect no protection of law in the anarchic Europe of the post-1878 period; she could only accept an alliance. At least she gained by it the neutralization of any eventual temporal plot of the Vatican which might become dangerous in case of a return to power of the French Right parties.' (ibid. p. 86).

* * * * * * *

ENVOI:

From The Papal Conquest (1909):

'Austria, like the Roman Catholic Church, is Italy's “Eternal Enemy.” ... Her whole policy, especially during recent years, has been one of provocation, and almost of unconcealed hostility. She has made military roads, built forts, and mined bridges, wherever her frontier is contiguous with that of Italy. When Italy was prostrated by the great earthquake disasters in Sicily and Calabria, and every civilized nation in the world was tendering sympathy and help, the Vienna papers said : “See how generous we are not to profit by this opportunity to make war”; and they boasted that the Emperor was with them in entertaining the idea. I have another cartoon, which represents the Pope and the Emperor Francis Joseph rubbing their hands over the catastrophe, the Pope saying : “Serves Italy right, she took from you Lombardy and Venetia,” and the Emperor replying : “Serves Italy right, she took from you the Temporal Power.” Pasolini never spake truer words than when he said that “Italy will always side with the enemies of Austria,” and that “the alliance of France, England, and Italy is the strongest guarantee for civilization, and the freedom of the world.” [Guiseppe Pasolini Memorie Racolte da suo Figlio, pp. 328, 332.] The Vatican looks to the Government of Austria, its bond-servant, to restore the Temporal Power; but, as we have already said, England blocks the way. Austria cannot move in the matter, either to regain Venetia and Lombardy, or to help the Pope to the Temporal Power, until England is humiliated. The Pope and the Church must first find a power to attempt this, find a power that will dare to make war upon England. And a serious war it will be. The Roman Catholic writer in The Month knew that when he said : “It may very well be that the future prosperity of England may be staked in the struggle.”

'Well the world knows – it has again and again been declared – that the Pope and the Church have found such a power in Germany, and that in the person of the Kaiser they have found the very man to inspire and lead the nation in this enterprise. Amongst his [the Kaiser's] great and varied talents, his boundless ambition and self-confidence which would lead him to undertake almost anything, he possesses, in quite a phenomenal degree, these two qualifications for the task – hatred of England and love of the Pope. I believe he stands unique amongst the rulers of the world in this respect; and it is the more strange it should be so, seeing he [the Kaiser] professes to be a Christian and a Protestant. Yet that he possesses, or rather, is possessed by, these two passions [hatred of England and love of the Pope], there can, I think, be no doubt.

'The Pope, as I have already had occasion to say, feels very much at home in the company of Venetians, and talks freely to them on most subjects. In this way the Kaiser and his strange doings form not infrequently a topic of conversation, or at least a subject of passing remark. Indeed, this can hardly be avoided, for his portrait is a prominent object in the Pope's rooms. Here it is on a table, there it hangs on a wall, yonder it is in an album; whilst on his breast, suspended on a massive gold chain, sparkles a magnificent cross, composed entirely of emeralds, a gift of the Kaiser to Leo XIII. When anyone noticing these things calls the Pope's attention to them, a smile of amusement lights up his face as he comes out with his favourite joke about the Kaiser, “Why, he is my best European friend!” The statement is a joke, and yet it is a literal truth. No Catholic fanatic in the world is more punctilious than he is in sending his homage and congratulations, and flattering speeches and presents to the Pope on his ever-recurring personal festivities, such as the anniversaries, the semi-jubilees and jubilees, actual or prospective, of the day on which he was born, or was christened, or became a priest, or began to climb the ecclesiastical ladder, or reached its summit and vaulted into the chair of St. Peter. . . . (pp. 322-324).

'The result of this unholy alliance, of this union in mutual love of each other and detestation of England, is that the Kaiser has become the willing instrument of the Pope and the Vatican for the humiliation of England, in order to [facilitate] the ultimate restoration of the Temporal Power. What Richard Bagot, the Roman Catholic novelist, wrote during the Boer War, in the number of the National Review for May 1900, holds equally true to-day, that “the whole campaign against England was due to the intrigues of the Vatican, which is working, as it has ever worked and ever will work, to promote and encompass the humiliation of England.” [The National Review, May, 1900.]

'Italy has long known that the Vatican has been egging on the German Emperor to invade England, and has for years warned us of our peril. She has done this with all the greater earnestness and persistency that she knows that her own turn will come next. She has told us that just as the naval and military preparations of Germany, carried on with such mad haste and to such an abnormal extent, are, in her opinion, directed against England : so the similar preparations carried on in the same spirit by Austria, are directed against herself ; and that, in the event of England's humiliation, Austria will at once, backed by Germany, attempt to recover Venetia and Lombardy; and then, as Dr. White's eminent Roman Catholic diplomat at the Hague said, Italy will be deluged in blood, in the attempt to restore the Temporal Power.

'I think that Great Britain is pretty well alive now to this peril against which Italy has warned us; and it would be an easy task for me to marshal facts in its support, to show, indeed, that the peril is very great and very near . . . Indeed, I have already written out these facts, but at the last moment I withhold them from a sense of the grave responsibility of publishing anything that might be construed as inciting to war. At the same time, there is less need that I should recount them, as many of them are now widely known, having been discussed in the British Parliament and in the public Press; and as Italy's interpretation of Germany's objective is very generally accepted by men of political complexions as the correct one.

'It has long been known in Italy, and Italy has warned England of the fact, that the original date fixed upon by the Pope and the Kaiser for the carrying out of their nefarious enterprise was 1911-1912. This date has been mentioned also several times in the British Parliament and in the Press. I am in possession of the reasons that led to the selection of this date. They are many and various, some touching Germany, others England, and Italy, and not a few having reference to the disaffected state of Ireland at our own doors, and of Ireland across the ocean. However, I do not intend here to enter further into them, all the more that the partial awakening of England to the danger of the situation has probably spoilt the project for so early a date as the one indicated.' (pp. 327-329).

* * * * * * *

A larger excerpt from The Papal Conquest can be found in the Archive for January 2010 on the World War Armageddon blog.

War 1914: Punishing the Serbs

Excerpts from official papers : –

'M.N. Pashitch, [Serbian] Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Royal Serbian Legations abroad.

Belgrade, June 18/July 1, 1914.

'The Austrian and Hungarian press are blaming Serbia more and more for the Sarajevo outrage. Their aim is transparent, viz., to destroy that high moral reputation which Serbia now enjoys in Europe, and to take the fullest advantage politically against Serbia of the act of a young and ill-balanced fanatic. But, in Serbia itself, the Sarajevo outrage has been most severely condemned in all circles of society, inasmuch as all, official as well as unofficial, immediately recognised that this outrage would be most prejudicial not only to our good neighbourly relations with Austria-Hungary but also to our co-nationalists in that country, as recent occurrences have proved. At a moment when Serbia is doing everything in her power to improve her relations with the neighbouring Monarchy, it is absurd to think that Serbia could have directly or indirectly inspired acts of this kind. On the contrary, it was of the greatest interest to Serbia to prevent the perpetration of this outrage. Unfortunately this did not lie within Serbia's power, as both assassins are Austrian subjects. Hitherto Serbia has been careful to suppress anarchic elements, and after recent events she will redouble her vigilance, and in the event of such elements existing within her borders will take the severest measures against them....'

*******

'Sir Edward Grey [British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs] to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.

Foreign Office, July 23, 1914.

' ... I could not help dwelling upon the awful consequences involved in the situation.... [I]t would be very desirable that those who had influence in St. Petersburgh should use it on behalf of patience and moderation.... [T]he amount of influence that could be used... would depend upon how reasonable were the Austrian demands and how strong the justification that Austria might have discovered for making her demands. The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as many as four Great Powers of Europe – let us say, Austria, France, Russia, and Germany – were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money, and such an interference with trade, that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry. In these days, in great industrial States, this would mean a state of things worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who were victors in the war, many things might be completely swept away....'

*******

'Sir Edward Grey [British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs] to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

'Note addressed to Serbia, together with an explanation of the reasons leading up to it, has been communicated to me by [the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador] Count Mensdorff.

'In the ensuing conversation with his Excellency, I remarked that it seemed to me a matter for great regret that a time limit, and such a short one at that, had been insisted upon at this stage of the proceedings. The murder of the Archduke and some of the circumstances respecting Serbia quoted in the note aroused sympathy with Austria, as was natural, but at the same time I had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Serbia's independent sovereignty if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Serbia....'

*******

'Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey [British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs]. – (Received July 24.)

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 24, 1914.

' ... I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of His Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from His Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in Serbia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion....

'French Ambassador and M. Sazonof [Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs] both continued to press me for a declaration of complete solidarity of His Majesty's Government with French and Russian Governments, and I therefore said that it seemed to me possible that you might perhaps be willing to make strong representations to both German and Austrian Governments, urging upon them that an attack by Austria upon Serbia would endanger the whole peace of Europe. Perhaps you might see your way to saying to them that such action on the part of Austria would probably mean Russian intervention, which would involve France and Germany, and that it would be difficult for Great Britain to keep out if the war were to become general. M. Sazonof answered that we would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break out...'

*******

'Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d' Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey [British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs]. – (Received July 24.)

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 24, 1914.

'Austrian demands are considered absolutely unacceptable by Serbian Government, who earnestly trust that His Majesty's Government may see their way to induce Austrian Government to moderate them.

'This request was conveyed to me by Serbian Prime Minister, who returned early this morning to Belgrade. His Excellency is dejected, and is clearly very anxious as to developments that may arise.'

*******

'Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey [British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs]. – (Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 25, 1914.

' ... On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilising until you had had time to use your influence in favour of peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she would take no actions until it was forced upon her. Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present status quo in the Balkans, and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war....'

*******

'Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d' Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey [British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs]. – (Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

'The Council of Ministers is now drawing up their reply to the Austrian note. I am informed by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that it will be most conciliatory and will meet the Austrian demands in as large a measure as is possible.

'The following is a brief summary of the projected reply:–

'The Serbian Government consent to the publication of a declaration in the “Official Gazette.” The ten points are accepted with reservations. Serbian Government declare themselves ready to agree to a mixed commission of enquiry so long as the appointment of the commission can be shown to be in accordance with international usage. They consent to dismiss and prosecute those officers who can be clearly proved to be guilty, and they have already arrested the officer referred to in the Austrian note. They are prepared to suppress the Narodna Odbrana ['Defence of the People': a Serbian nationalist group].

'The Serbian Government consider that, unless the Austrian Government want war at any cost, they cannot but be content with the full satisfaction offered in the Serbian reply.'

*******

'Sir Edward Grey [British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs] to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

' ... The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian démarche makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will have mobilised against each other. In this event, the only chance of peace, in my opinion, is for the other four Powers to join in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the four Powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburgh to try and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view, I feel strongly that France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly co-operate....'

*******

'Reply of Serbian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note. – (Communicated by Serbian Minister, July 27.)

(Translation.)

' ... The Royal Government [of Serbia] also agree to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

'The Royal Government [of Serbia] must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Serbia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations....'

*******

'Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey [British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs]. – (Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 27, 1914.

'I have had conversations with all my colleagues representing the Great Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war with Serbia...'

*******

'Sir Edward Grey [British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs] to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

' ... The German Ambassador said the view of the German Government was that Austria could not by force be humiliated, and could not abdicate her position as a Great Power. I said I entirely agreed, but it was not a question of humiliating Austria, it was a question of how far Austria meant to push the humiliation of others....'

*******

'Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey [British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs]. – (Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, August 1, 1914.

' ... In the evening M. Sazonof [Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs] had an interview with the Austrian Ambassador who, not being definitely instructed by his Government, did his best to deflect the conversation towards a general discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia instead of keeping to the question of Serbia. In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his desire that these relations should remain friendly, and said that, taken in general, they were perfectly satisfactory; but the real question which they had to solve at this moment was whether Austria was to crush Serbia and to reduce her to the status of a vassal, or whether she was to leave Serbia a free and independent State....'

ARMAGEDDON: The Vatican Against Europe

(A cartoon of Pope Pius X, and Cardinal Merry del Val, From L'ASINO, 6 June 1909, As reproduced in The Papal Conquest)

In his work Hitler's Pope: The Secret History of Pius XII, John Cornwell writes:

'When Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife were gunned down by a pan-Serbian agitator in Sarajevo on June 28, [1914] the emotions prompted by the Serbian Concordat [signed between the Vatican and Serbia a few days earlier on June 24, 1914] became part of the general groundswell of anti-Serbian anger. The concordant nevertheless represented a contribution to the tensions that led the Austrian government to overplay its hand by delivering a humiliating ultimatum to Serbia. There is no indication that Pope Pius X grasped the role of the Holy See in adding to the pressures that brought the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Serbia to the brink. The declaration of war, it is said, threw him into a profound depression from which he never recovered. He died on August 20, 1914 – of a broken heart, it was said.'

(Hitler's Pope; American paperback edition – Penguin Books, 1999, 2000; pp. 57-58).

In a later post I'd like to give some details of the Vatican-Serbian Concordant of June 1914 – but firstly, concerning the claim that Pius X died of 'a broken heart' soon after the outbreak of war:

That this is the official 'version' can be adduced from the following, which is written in the Concise Holy History used in parochial catechisms:

'Pius X did all he could to prevent the war of 1914 and died of grief when he foresaw the evils it was about to unleash.'

Count Carlo Sforza, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Italy, in a chapter on 'The Origins of the [First World] War', in his Contemporary Italy: Its Intellectual and Moral Origins (1944/6) calls the rumour of Pius X succumbing to grief at his 'impotence to advert the disaster' of the war, as: 'A legend more tenacious than history'. And then to, 'establish the truth as to that legend', he quotes extensively from official letters deposited in the diplomatic correspondence of the Austro-Hungarian Embassy – correspondence that he himself had seen.

In a double posting for the start of this month, I include excerpts from the relevant chapter of Count Sforza's work in a seperate post below this one. The majority of the post appearing here, under the subheading, The Vatican Against Europe, is culled from a book of the same name by Edmund Paris, which was originally published in France in 1959, under the title, Le Vatican contre l'Europe; and was later translated into English by A. Robson and published as, The Vatican Against Europe; reprinted, 1988, 1993, by The Wickliffe Press (Protestant Truth Society) with a Preface by the Rev. Dr. Alan C. Clifford, B.A., M.Litt., Ph.D.

Concerning Pius X and the outbreak of war, Edmund Paris writes:

'Pierre Dominique, [in La politique des Jésuites (Grasset, Paris 1955, pp. 245-246)] on the authority of Count Sforza's Memoirs and of diplomatic documents, shows how far the Vatican was from considering conciliation [during the events that would initiate the First World War]:

'“. . . We have access to a certain number of documents”, continues Pierre Dominique, “whose analysis shows beyond doubt that, at least in the beginning, the Vatican looked with satisfaction upon a venture in which the crushing of Serbia would have entailed a decrease in the influence of Russia, whose prestige the Roman Church detested. . . . In these conversations the Secretary of State [Cardinal Merry del Val] spoke explicitly in the name of the Pope, who, he informed the Austrian representative, deplored the fact that Austria had not before this inflicted upon the Serbs the punishment they deserved.”

'Indeed the despatch of 29 July 1914 from Count Palffy, Austrian Chargé d' Affaires at the Vatican, to Count Berchtold, Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, leaves no doubt that Pope Pius X and the Curia wanted war. Here is the Document [Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für neuere Geschichte Österreichs, 26 Wien–Leipzig 1930, pp. 893 and 894]:

'“In times of extreme political tension such as those we are now going through, human fantasy runs away with itself, redoubles its intensity and soon goes beyond the limits of common sense. Thus the last few days there has again been a rumour that Pope Pius X has intervened in the Serbian conflict and had been in touch with His Apostolic Imperial Majesty, entreating him to spare the Christian nations the horrors of war. An argument based on such absurd premises is of course bound to lead to the conclusion, as logical as it is erroneous, that there was in fact intervention by the Pope. The real opinion of the Curia is not without interest. When, two days ago, I went to the Cardinal Secretary of State, he did, of course, speak about the serious questions and problems that at present preoccupy the whole of Europe. His Eminence's conversation bore no sign of any particular goodwill or moderation. He unreservedly approved the note addressed to Serbia, and he indirectly expressed the hope the Monarchy would hold out to the end. 'It goes without saying', remarked the Cardinal, 'that it is regrettable that Serbia should not have been brought low a long time ago.' This declaration is equally consonant with the Pope's opinion: many a time during the past year His Holiness has expressed his regret that Austria-Hungary should have missed the opportunity to subdue its Danubian neighbour”.

'Austria's representative at the Vatican then endeavours to justify the attitude of Pope Pius X with arguments which, according to Pierre Dominique, [op. cit., pp. 247 and 248] Count Sforza reports in these terms:

'“One might well ask oneself why the Catholic Church adopts such a bellicose attitude. The answer is very simple. The Pope and the Curia see in Serbia a consuming disease which, little by little, has penetrated to the very marrow of the Monarchy and which, in time, would end by disintegrating it . . . Austria-Hungary is and remains the Catholic state par excellence, the strongest buttress of religion that is now left to the Church. For the Church the fall of this buttress would mean the loss of her strongest support; she would see the fall of her most devoted champion in the battle against Orthodoxy . . . In the light of this fact, it is not difficult to forge a link between the apostolic feelings and the spirit of war.”' (ibid. pp.43-45).

At this point, it seems appropriate, for a moment, to break away from Edmund Paris' work and to reflect on the words of Christopher Wordsworth, D.D. (The nephew of the poet 'Wordsworth'; and at the time of the work to be cited below's writing, Canon of Westminster – and later, Anglican Bishop of Lincoln). Though the 'Orthodoxy' that he writes about below, should not be assumed to be that of the 'Eastern' variety, he writes thus – concerning the 'three unclean spirits like frogs', that in Revelation ch. 16; v. 13-16 gather 'the kings of the earth' to the great 'battle' (more properly, 'war') which is styled in the Apocalypse, 'Armageddon' :

'As the Psalmist says, describing the plagues of Egypt, the land brought forth Frogs, even in their Kings' chambers [Ps. cv. 30.]. . . . Such is the Plague which St. John announces to the World in the Sixth Vial. He represents it as issuing from the mouth of the Dragon, – the Devil – and of the Beast, and of the False Prophet.

'Thus he foretels that the Papacy, distressed by the ebbing of its strength . . . will hate Orthodoxy worse than Scepticism, and will endeavour to persuade mankind that they cannot be Christians unless they are Papists, and thus will do the Dragon's work, and promote Infidelity. He portends that Roman Preachers, Ministers of the False Prophet, will advocate doctrines of political licentiousness, and flatter Rulers and Nations with seducing words . . .'

(From: Lectures on the Apocalypse; Critical, Expository, and Practical; Delivered Before the University of Cambridge; Third Edition, 1852; pp. 387-388).

Returning back to Edmund Paris' work he continues:

'To [the] overwhelming document [already cited above] may be added another, no less official . . . In July 1913, after the signature of the Peace of Bucarest, Austria-Hungary was already threatening to attack Serbia, and it was the turn of the Austrian prince Schönburg to go and acquaint himself with the feeling of the Vatican on the subject. This is how he reports [Document P.A. XI/291] to Count Berchtold the conversations that he had there at the end of October and on 3 November 1913:

'“Among the first subjects tackled by the Cardinal Secretary of State during our interview last week, as was to be expected, was the question of Serbia. The Cardinal began by expressing his joy at the energetic and commendable attitude which we have recently adopted. During today's audience (upon which I have made a separate report, see document A), His Holiness, who began the interview by mentioning the energetic step we have taken at Belgrade, made several very characteristic remarks. 'Certainly,' then said His Holiness, 'Austria-Hungary would have done better to punish the Serbs for all the mistakes that have been made.'” (pp. 45-46).

To set the above dispatch within its historical context, I quote now from J'Accuse! 'By A German' (Richard Grelling); and translated by Alexander Gray, and published by Hodder and Stoughton, 1915 :

GIOLITTI'S REVELATIONS.

'It is known that, soon after the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Austrian Government proposed to take military measures against the growing Great-Serbian movement, which had been produced as a result of the annexation. This was an act of criminal insanity on the part of Austria; it was a crime, because here the violator intended to punish the violated because he resisted violation; it was insane, because national tendencies cannot be suppressed by force of arms. But the wise men of Austria thought otherwise. Serbia was threatened with war, and only through the submission of Russia and the mediation of England and Germany was it possible to prevent, by means of a propitiatory declaration on the part of Serbia, the European war which even then threatened to break out. That was in March, 1909, and is known to everyone. What, however, was not known, and has only become known by the revelations of Giolitti [the Italian Prime Minister] on December 5th, 1914, in the Italian Chamber, is the fact that Austria entertained in August, 1913, the same intentions as in 1909, and was prevented from giving effect to these intentions only by the opposition of Italy.

'These revelations of Giolitti have rightly been regarded in the whole of the foreign Press as epoch-making, because they revealed in an incontestable manner the aggressive intentions of Austria. But precisely for these reasons the German and Austrian Governments have preserved, with regard to these revelations, a silence as of death. There is therefore all the more reason why I should in this place once more awaken the dead to life.

'In midsummer, 1913, after the second Balkan War, the relations in the Balkans between those States immediately concerned were regulated by the Treaty of Bucharest. Austria-Hungary was not satisfied with the arrangement to which effect was given, since in her view Serbia had got too much and Bulgaria too little. She aimed at accomplishing a revision of the Treaty and in view of Serbia's opposition resolved to give effect to her desires by arms. For this purpose she naturally required the support of the Powers of the Triple Alliance and above all of Italy, who had always claimed the right to make her influence felt in the settlement of the Balkan question. The concurrence of the allied Powers in military action against Serbia was, however, regarded as necessary by Austria chiefly, because the Austrian Government was even then fully aware of the fact that a war with Serbia must lead to a European struggle. Austria consequently addressed inquiries to Italy with a view to ascertaining what her attitude would be in view of her duties under the Triple Alliance in the event of a Serbian, and, should it arise, a European war. As a result of the Austrian inquiry the following exchange of telegrams took place between the Foreign Minister, Di San Giuliano, and the Prime Minister, Giolitti, who was then absent: “Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her intention of taking action against Serbia, and defines such action as defensive, hoping to bring into operation the casus fœderis of the Triple Alliance, which, on the contrary, I believe to be inapplicable. I am endeavouring to arrange for a combined effort with Germany to prevent such action on the part of Austria, but it may become necessary to state clearly that we do not consider such action, if it should be taken, as defensive, and that, therefore, we do not consider that the casus fœderis arises. Please telegraph to me at Rome if you approve.”

'Giolitti replied to this: “If Austria intervenes against Serbia it is clear that a casus fœderis cannot be established. It is a step which she is taking on her own account since there is no question of defence inasmuch as no one is thinking of attacking her. It is necessary that a declaration to this effect should be made to Austria in the most formal manner, and we must hope for action on the part of Germany to dissuade Austria from this most perilous adventure (pericolosissima avventura).”

'On this occasion success, in fact, attended the task of restraining Austria from a war against Serbia, but whether this was due to Germany's efforts or to Italy's opposition is not known. What, however, is to-day of the highest interest is the fact that, even a year before the outbreak of the present war, Austria was firmly resolved to initiate, without any urgent reason, a military conflict with Serbia, for there was then no question of the death of an Archduke . . .' (J'Accuse!; pp. 121-124).

Concerning these tumultuous times, and the first Balkan War, Joseph Goricar, formerly of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Service, recounts:

'[L]eaflets were circulated, through the agency of our Socialists, among the Polish workmen throughout Russian Poland urging them, when called to the colours on the outbreak of hostilities, to destroy as far as possible all military materials, to “spoil everything that could aid the Russian armies in their advance,” and above all, “to let themselves be taken prisoners.” The all-Polish organ, Slowo Polskie of Lwow, capital of Galicia, published an article which concluded with these words: “In holding before its eyes the reconstruction of the Kingdom of Poland, the Polish nation must hold itself in readiness for war at any moment.” These anti-Russian and pro-German protestations occurred at the very time when the forcible expropriation of Polish estates in the German Ostmark was at its height. In this campaign the Socialist, Polish, Jewish, and Pan-German press was ably supported by organs controlled by the Vatican. Among these the Oesterreichs Katholische Sonntags Blatt came out at the beginning of the first Balkan war with this declaration:

'“Our ideal is not to perpetuate European Turkey, but to bring the Balkan Peninsula into the possession of Catholic Austria and the Catholic Church.” This ideal was thus defended in their issue of October 27th :

“Just as a violent storm refreshes and cleanses the oppressive atmosphere, so we hold when it once comes to real war the moral and economic gain to Europe will in the end be very great. The social democracy is not yet strong enough to prevent a war. As a result of the emotional pressure of a European war it will break to pieces with its millions of casual followers, and under the same pressure modern liberalism will also break down. It will not hurt Europe if its conditions are for once well shaken up.”'

(From: The Inside Story of Austro-German Intrigue, or, How the World War Was Brought About, by Joseph Goricar, Formerly of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Service, and Lyman Beecher Stowe; published Garden City New York, Doubleday, Page & Company, 1920; pp. 94-95).

After which, it seems fitting to reappraise the following words that appear in Dr. Andrew D. White's Autobiography (vol. ii. pp. 349-351); as quoted in the Rev. Alexander Robinson's, The Papal Conquest; words that issued forth from the mouth of a man, whom Dr. White (of Cornell University, and late Ambassador at Berlin of the United States of America; and President of the American Delegation at the Hague Conference, 1899) described as being, 'a leading Roman Catholic diplomat who represented one of the great Catholic Powers'; here again are some of that statesman's incriminating sentiments as expressed to Dr. White after the Hague Conference:

'The Vatican has always been, and is to-day, a storm-centre. The Pope and his advisers have never hesitated to urge on war, no matter how bloody, when the slightest of their ordinary worldly purposes could be served by it. . . . Their whole policy is based on stirring up hatred and promoting conflicts from which they hope to draw worldly advantage.' (p. 315).

Before returning back to Edmund Paris' work – so as to give, again, some of the historical background to the final official document he quotes from – a quick return back to Richard Grelling's J'Accuse! supplies us with the following information:

'The indictment to be brought against the Empires of Germany and Austria is that in the summer of 1914 they intentionally brought about the war which they had long prepared and desired, because they thought that the moment was specially favourable for striking the blow. This time the occasion of the dispute was not, as in previous years, a paltry territorial question in the Balkans, a squabble about a harbour or a stretch of sea-shore, questions which could neither arouse public interest nor kindle the enthusiasm of nations. The issue raised on this occasion related to the murder of an Arch-Duke and his Consort, a tragic event which was bound to awaken the indignation of the whole world, and, so they calculated, could not fail to enlist universal sympathy on behalf of the Powers who appeared as the avengers of such a crime.

'Thus, in the first place, the moral advantage was on their side. But they believed that they could also rely on a similar military advantage. Certain matters just about this time had come to light which were regarded as proving the disorganisation of the French and the defective preparation of the Russian army. The revelations of Senator Humbert had just made public the existence of serious defects in the French Army, and it was believed that the Russian Army, quite apart from its defective equipment, was still required to cope with internal unrest and weakened by civil dissensions. England's neutrality was still hoped for, in spite of previous failures in this direction, and the Italians were thought to be foolish enough to draw the chestnuts out of the fire in the Balkans for the hated Austrian, and to risk their whole national existence “pour le roi de Prusse.”

'All this was a complete miscalculation. But as the art of calculation was not understood in Berlin and Vienna, it was thought that the moment was favourable for striking – and they struck.' (pp. 136-137).

Returning, finally, back to The Vatican Against Europe – and in the light of the official documents thus far perused in his work – Edmund Paris continues:

'Far be it from us to question the good faith of the Holy Father's apologists. At the same time, we cannot help asking by what miracle are his unequivocal appeals for war transformed, in their eyes, into appeals for peace? Let us confess in all humility that we are unable to explain this fantastic state of affairs. But no matter: we have now established, beyond all possible question, with official records, the way in which Pius X “did all he could to prevent the war of 1914”.

'Might it be said, nevertheless, in an attempt to excuse him, that he was hoping to see the conflict limited to Austria-Hungary and Serbia? Let us hear the pious René Bazin, of the Académie française, another author who cannot be suspected of bias against the Vatican [who wrote in Pie X (Flammarion, Paris 1928, pp. 88 and 89)]:

'“Pius X ruled the Church from 4 August 1903 to 20 August 1914. On 2 June of that year, he entered his eightieth year. The war was approaching. He had foreseen this upheaval of the world; he had more than once said to Cardinal Merry del Val, who used to bring him diplomatic despatches and other papers of the previous day, whenever he was explaining some serious question:

'“What is that, compared with what is to come? The Great War is coming: 1914 will not be over before it breaks out.

'“To the Minister of Brazil, who was taking leave of him, Pius X said: 'You are fortunate', the Pope told him, 'you will not see the Great War at close quarters.'

'“The diplomat, struck by this remark, wrote to several of his friends about it. Less than three months later, five nations were mobilising their armies, and Germany was invading Belgium.”

'Can it be maintained, after this, that the Holy Father did not foresee the extension of the conflict? On the contrary, he foresaw it so well, that he expressly mentioned it before a diplomat, during an interview recorded in another official document which is quoted by Count Sforza and Pierre Dominique:

“The day before, on 26 July [1914], Baron Ritter, Chargé d' Affaires of Bavaria at the Holy See, had written to his Government:

“The Pope approves of Austria's harsh treatment of Serbia. He has no great opinion of the armies of Russia and France in the event of a war against Germany. The Cardinal Secretary of State does not see when Austria could make war if she does not decide to do so now.”

[Author's Note: This despatch from Baron Ritter appears in, Bayerische Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch, III (Bavarian Documents on the Outbreak of War), p. 206.]

'“The authenticity of these two texts has been acknowledged after many debates in the Catholic press . . .” notes Pierre Dominique [La politique des Jésuites, pp. 248 and 250]. “The key to the question maintains Count Sforza, along with a few others, was the necessity of converting Francis Joseph to the idea of war. The opinions of the Pope and his minister were certainly the most likely to influence him. Hence the despatch of Count Palffy. . . .” (pp. 46-47).

' . . . Thus, it is proved that Pius X and his Secretary of State, when they encouraged the most Catholic Emperor to make war, were coldly contemplating the consequences of their act: a general conflict which would set the Central European Empires against France and Russia. They believed they had accurately estimated the strength of the different forces involved.

'But, what His Holiness and his accomplice had not foreseen was the participation in the war of England and finally of the entire Anglo-Saxon world, a participation which was to thwart their plans, tip the scales in favour of France and liberate the Orthodox populations from the Viennese yoke.

* * *

'Hence the responsibility for the crime is beyond doubt – an enormous crime which, over a period of four years, was to throw into the charnel-house millions of “Christian” corpses, all the flower of European youth, and a crime all the more odious for being completely premeditated.

'One may say quite specifically that in 1914, the Roman Church started the series of hellish wars. It was then that the tribute of blood which she has always taken from the people began to swell into a veritable torrent.' (pp. 47-48).

Envoi

'[O]ne feels that it is impiety or culpable ignorance to talk, as so many do, of the Pope being the Vicar of the Prince of Peace, and of the Roman Catholic Church as having a mission of peace and of goodwill to mankind. He [the Pope] is, on the contrary, the Vicar of Christ's Adversary [Satan], [who is] “The Prince of this World”; [John xii. 31, xiv. 30.] he [the Pope] is the “Beast” of the Revelation, to whom the “Dragon” [Satan] gave “his power, and his seat, and great authority . . . to make war with the saints.” [Rev. xiii. 2, 7.]'

Rev. Alexander Robertson, D.D., The Papal Conquest (1909), p. 316.

Count Sforza on “The Origins of the War”

THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR

'In 1914 the Germany of William II and the Austria-Hungary of the Hapsburgs were guilty of the same error as Hitler in 1939 and Mussolini in 1940: they despised their eventual adversaries too much. In 1939 Hitler believed, since they had allowed him to assassinate Czechoslovakia, that he could do the same to Poland; in 1940 Mussolini believed, like Petain and Weygand, that Great Britain would be incapable of resisting after France's fall.

'The former Ambassador of Austria-Hungary at London, Count Mensdorf, said to me one day after the monarchy he had loyally and skilfully served had come to its end: “Yes, you are right; they were mad, at Vienna and Budapest – Berchtold as mad as Tisza to have unleashed the great war after Serajevo. But Berchtold, at least, and all the Austrians with him, always believed from the bottom of their hearts that they would end by letting Austria have her little war with Serbia ; hadn't Europe swallowed without wincing all the acts of violence of the Central Empires? Fundamentally, we were tricked by the Entente; we were sure they had decided never to make war against us. . . .”'

(Contemporary Italy Its Intellectual and Moral Origins, by Count Carlo Sforza; Frederick Muller Ltd., London, 1946; p. 145)

'The assassination of Francis Ferdinand of Hapsburg and his wife at Serajevo on June 24, 1914, seemed to the camarilla of the Court of Vienna and to the feudal Hungarians a fortunate pretext sent by the gods.

'That Serajevo was only a pretext is proved by the compilation of the memorial written in Vienna, actually several days before June 28, formally to request German assistance for an attack on Serbia. . . . The famous memorial presented to the Emperor William after the death of Francis Joseph's heir, to assure Austria the support of her German ally, had been prepared and completely drafted previously, on the morrow of the German Kaiser's visit to Francis Ferdinand at the castle of Konopisht in mid-May, 1914. The assassination of Serajevo had no other result than to add to the already prepared document the following postscript:

'“This memorial had already been completed when the terrible events of Serajevo supervened. One can scarcely realize the full import of this abominable assassination which has, nevertheless, if indeed that were still necessary, produced the irrefutable proof of the impossibility of putting an end to the antagonism between the Monarchy and Serbia, as well as the danger and intensity of the Pan-Serbian propaganda that recoils at nothing. . . . Under these conditions the necessity of breaking with an energetic hand the net in which her adversary wishes to suffocate her is imposed on the Monarchy.”

'The Bosnian crisis had been, as I have said, the dress rehearsal for that of 1914, with this difference, however, that in 1909 the Austrian statesmen dominated the events, whereas in 1914 Aerenthal's successors were but the victims of their passions and puppets of the events.

'Aerenthal had had a view of the future, limited but clear; moreover, he was a man and in a certain sense a new man. Berchtold, his successor, was only the symbol of the old Austria whose real masters were the old narrow-minded bureaucrats, like Count Forgach, who one day said to one of his subordinates at the Ballplatz, Baron Szilassy, a Hungarian like himself: “I wish that in all the offices of the Ministry they would inscribe this maxim: Serbia delenda est” (Serbia must be destroyed.)

'I knew Forgach as a young diplomat at Constantinople and was aware of the hate he already had for anything Slavic, even before the ridiculous part he played before all Europe in the affair of the forgery of the Friedjung case. Minister in China from 1911, I never again saw Forgach, who became all-powerful at the Ballplatz. But from Peking I returned and spent several weeks in Austria in 1912 and 1913. Duke Avarna, then Ambassador of Italy, Dumaine, Ambassador of France, Count Dudzeele, my wife's father and Minister of Belgium who, like myself, had known Forgach intimately at Constantinople, all insisted that the danger in Vienna was that, thanks to Forgach, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, instead of acting as a counterweight to the preference of the military circles for war, excited them still more.

'The memorandum which was to decide the European war could have issued only from a Ministry of Foreign Affairs directed by men of Forgach's stripe.

'The fatal document started for Berlin on the evening of July 4. Count Hoyos, Berchtold's Chief of Cabinet, carried it. The next day, July 5, Emperor Francis Joseph gave a long audience to the Chief of Staff, Conrad, who left an exact report of the conversation:

'“I expressed”, wrote Conrad, “my opinion of the inevitability of war with Serbia.”

“The Emperor: Yes, that's perfectly true, but how do you expect to make war if everyone attacks us, especially Russia?

“Conrad: Doesn't Germany shield us?

“The Emperor: Are we sure about Germany?

“Conrad: But we ought to know, Your Majesty, the situation we are in.

“The Emperor: A note left last night for Berlin; we asked for a point-blank reply.

“Conrad: And if the reply assures that Germany places herself beside us, shall we make war on Serbia?

“The Emperor: In that case, yes.”'

(pp. 147-149)

'Three days after his meeting with Francis Joseph, on July 8, Conrad had a definitive conversation with Berchtold. The meticulous exactness with which Conrad reproduced it in his memoirs* is surprising; it is the language of a conspiracy, and he does not realize it. [*From footnote: 'Conrad's memoirs, Aus Meiner Dienstzeit (My Years of Service), has the advantage of sincerity where other writers, more anxious about public opinion, would have been tempted to gloss over the truth.']

'“Berchtold: What will happen if Serbia lets matters slide until the mobilization, and then yields completely?

“Conrad: Then we invade Serbian territory.

“Berchtold: And if Serbia does nothing?

“Conrad: Then Serbia will remain occupied until all our war expenses have been paid.

“Berchtold: Shall we delay the ultimatum until after the harvest, and after the Serajevo inquest?

“Conrad: Better to-day than to-morrow; we have to exploit the situation. The moment our adversaries suspect anything they are going to prepare.

“Berchtold: We'll take care that the secret will be strictly kept and that nothing shall be known by anyone.

“Conrad: About what date should the ultimatum be sent?

“Berchtold: In a fortnight, July 22. It would be a good idea for you, as well as for the Minister of War, to go on leave for a while so as to dissipate any kind of anxiety.”

'Such was the atmosphere at Vienna when Francis Ferdinand's assassination seemed the most fortunate of opportunities, one which had been lacking in 1913, and one that at no price should be missed again. Apponyi's “At last!” was the avowal of the official world. Those who hesitated, like Tisza, did not do so from love of peace, but because they were not sure of being sufficiently aided by Germany. The moment William II's “Now or never” became known at Vienna and Budapest, there was not a Magyar nor an Austrian-German who was not for the war. At the time of the dramatic interview that took place on November 2, 1918, between the members of the Deutschoesterreicher Staatsrat and Emperor Charles, when the latter protested “not having wanted it” and a Socialist leader indicated approbation, the old Christian-Socialist Dr. Mayer rose and, alone, had the dignity to declare:

'“Let us be sincere, gentlemen. We all wanted the war: even the people wanted it. You need only recall the enthusiasm of the summer of 1914. . . .”' (pp. 149-150)

* * *

'A legend more tenacious than history was formed in 1914 and afterward regarding Pope Pius X's attitude toward the Hapsburg aggression toward Serbia. This legend shows us Pius X praying and fighting against the outbreak of the war, horrified to see Christianity divided into two enemy camps, and dying of grief at the invasion of Belgium and all the horrors of war unchained. The truth is quite otherwise.

'During the war of 1914-18 the religious question had only a minor importance; both camps included Catholics, Protestants, Greek Orthodox members and Mohammedans. Catholic unity did not prevail any more than Mohammedan unity, which seemed so sure of its jihad (the Holy War proclaimed by the Sultan-Caliph, which neither Arab nor Hindu [Indian?] Moslem obeyed). The clergy of the different countries could all invoke Allah or the old God of Armies with opposite hopes.

'One fact, however, during the tragic weeks of July and August, 1914, scandalized European opinion: that the war should have been provoked in the name of God by a powerful and decrepit sovereign, Francis Joseph, Emperor of Austria and Apostolic King of Hungary, the most Catholic of all the sovereigns and the most important of all Catholic sovereigns. When this Prince declared that he made war to chastise Serbia, millions of timorous souls imagined that the Pope would intervene to prevent the catastrophe. This hope gave birth to the legend. It was said at the time that Pius X, the moment he knew of the ultimatum to Serbia, had enjoined his Nuncio at Vienna to admonish the old Emperor and King in the name of the Almighty. Then, since the war happened just the same, it was explained that the Ballplatz diplomats and military men of the imperial entourage had prevented Pius X's messenger from talking with the Emperor. And here is the last act of the legend: The Pope having died suddenly on August 20, 1914, it was affirmed that the good Pius had succumbed to grief, having realized his impotence to avert the disaster.

'It is time to establish the truth as to that legend, and here it is:

'As soon as the danger of war became evident, Count Palffy, Austrian Chargé d' Affaires at the Vatican, several times informed Pius X's Secretary of State, Cardinal Merry del Val, of the intentions and the “duties” of the Dual Monarchy. The Cardinal's replies were deposited in the diplomatic correspondence of the Austro-Hungarian Embassy, correspondence that I have seen. They reveal that the Vatican saw with satisfaction, at least at the outset, an undertaking in which the crushing of Serbia would entail a diminution of the influence of Russia. The latter's prestige was detested by the Roman Church, which viewed it as the principal obstacle to a reconciliation of the Oriental churches with the See of Rome. In these conversations the Secretary of State spoke expressly in the name of the Pope who, he declared to the Austrian representative, deplored that Austria had not earlier inflicted on the Serbs the chastisement they deserved. It is sufficient to quote the following passage from a dispatch of Count Palffy to Count Berchtold on July 29:

'“During the conversation I had two days ago with the Cardinal Secretary of State he spoke spontaneously of the great problems and questions now agitating Europe. It would be impossible to detect in His Eminence's words any spirit whatever of indulgence and conciliation. It is true he characterized the note to Serbia as very harsh, but he nevertheless approved it without any reservation and at the same time expressed, in an indirect way, the hope that the Monarchy would go to the limit. Certainly, added the Cardinal, it was too bad that Serbia had not been humiliated very much sooner, for then it might have been done without putting into play, as today, such immense possibilities. This declaration also corresponds to the Pope's way of thinking, for, in the course of recent years His Holiness has often expressed regret that Austro-Hungary has failed to 'chastise' her dangerous Danubian neighbour.

'“One might wonder for what motive the Catholic Church evinces herself so bellicose at an epoch when she is governed by a chief who is truly a saint, imbued with veritably apostolic ideas. The answer is very simple. The Pope and the Curia see in Serbia the ravaging malady that little by little penetrated the Monarchy to the marrow, and which, in time, would end by disintegrating it.

'“Despite all the other experiments attempted by the Curia in the course of the last decade, Austria-Hungary is and remains the Catholic State par excellence, the strongest rampart of the Faith which stands in our day for the Church of Christ. The fall of this rampart would signify for the Church the loss of its solidest prop; in the conflicts with the Orthodox Church she would see her most powerful champion struck down.

'“Hence, just as for Austria-Hungary there is an immediate necessity of self-preservation to expel from its organism, even by force if need be, the dissolving malady, there is also for the Catholic Church an indirect necessity of doing or approving everything that would serve to attain that end.

'“In this light, a harmony between the apostolic sentiment and the war spirit can easily be confirmed.”

'The widening of the conflict which from Austro-Serb became European changed probably the Pope's frame of mind. But at least in the very first days of the war he considered the march of the German army nach Paris as a punishment that God had inflicted on the “eldest daughter of the Church” who had given him the worst worries of his pontificate.' (pp. 153-155).

[The above paragraph in the American edition published by E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York, 1944 (by the same translators: Drake and Denise de Kay) reads slightly differently; as here follows:

'The widening of the conflict which from Austro-Serb became European did not do much to change the Pope's frame of mind. In his honest but narrow mind the march of the German army nach Paris assumed the form of a punishment that God had inflicted on the “eldest daughter of the Church” who had given him the worst worries of his pontificate.' (p. 189).]

'We have seen that the proceeding of the Nuncio at Vienna is a legend. That Pius X died of grief is still another. I have it from his doctor, my colleague in the Italian Senate, that the malady of which the Pope died had for long months wasted the old man by slow degrees, and that the overwork of the last few weeks could, at most, but have hastened the end that he, Marchiafava, had already declared inevitable and due to occur very shortly.' (p. 155)