THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR
'In 1914 the Germany of William II and the Austria-Hungary of the Hapsburgs were guilty of the same error as Hitler in 1939 and Mussolini in 1940: they despised their eventual adversaries too much. In 1939 Hitler believed, since they had allowed him to assassinate Czechoslovakia, that he could do the same to Poland; in 1940 Mussolini believed, like Petain and Weygand, that Great Britain would be incapable of resisting after France's fall.
'The former Ambassador of Austria-Hungary at London, Count Mensdorf, said to me one day after the monarchy he had loyally and skilfully served had come to its end: “Yes, you are right; they were mad, at Vienna and Budapest – Berchtold as mad as Tisza to have unleashed the great war after Serajevo. But Berchtold, at least, and all the Austrians with him, always believed from the bottom of their hearts that they would end by letting Austria have her little war with Serbia ; hadn't Europe swallowed without wincing all the acts of violence of the Central Empires? Fundamentally, we were tricked by the Entente; we were sure they had decided never to make war against us. . . .”'
(Contemporary Italy Its Intellectual and Moral Origins, by Count Carlo Sforza; Frederick Muller Ltd., London, 1946; p. 145)
'The assassination of Francis Ferdinand of Hapsburg and his wife at Serajevo on June 24, 1914, seemed to the camarilla of the Court of Vienna and to the feudal Hungarians a fortunate pretext sent by the gods.
'That Serajevo was only a pretext is proved by the compilation of the memorial written in Vienna, actually several days before June 28, formally to request German assistance for an attack on Serbia. . . . The famous memorial presented to the Emperor William after the death of Francis Joseph's heir, to assure Austria the support of her German ally, had been prepared and completely drafted previously, on the morrow of the German Kaiser's visit to Francis Ferdinand at the castle of Konopisht in mid-May, 1914. The assassination of Serajevo had no other result than to add to the already prepared document the following postscript:
'“This memorial had already been completed when the terrible events of Serajevo supervened. One can scarcely realize the full import of this abominable assassination which has, nevertheless, if indeed that were still necessary, produced the irrefutable proof of the impossibility of putting an end to the antagonism between the Monarchy and Serbia, as well as the danger and intensity of the Pan-Serbian propaganda that recoils at nothing. . . . Under these conditions the necessity of breaking with an energetic hand the net in which her adversary wishes to suffocate her is imposed on the Monarchy.”
'The Bosnian crisis had been, as I have said, the dress rehearsal for that of 1914, with this difference, however, that in 1909 the Austrian statesmen dominated the events, whereas in 1914 Aerenthal's successors were but the victims of their passions and puppets of the events.
'Aerenthal had had a view of the future, limited but clear; moreover, he was a man and in a certain sense a new man. Berchtold, his successor, was only the symbol of the old Austria whose real masters were the old narrow-minded bureaucrats, like Count Forgach, who one day said to one of his subordinates at the Ballplatz, Baron Szilassy, a Hungarian like himself: “I wish that in all the offices of the Ministry they would inscribe this maxim: Serbia delenda est” (Serbia must be destroyed.)
'I knew Forgach as a young diplomat at Constantinople and was aware of the hate he already had for anything Slavic, even before the ridiculous part he played before all Europe in the affair of the forgery of the Friedjung case. Minister in China from 1911, I never again saw Forgach, who became all-powerful at the Ballplatz. But from Peking I returned and spent several weeks in Austria in 1912 and 1913. Duke Avarna, then Ambassador of Italy, Dumaine, Ambassador of France, Count Dudzeele, my wife's father and Minister of Belgium who, like myself, had known Forgach intimately at Constantinople, all insisted that the danger in Vienna was that, thanks to Forgach, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, instead of acting as a counterweight to the preference of the military circles for war, excited them still more.
'The memorandum which was to decide the European war could have issued only from a Ministry of Foreign Affairs directed by men of Forgach's stripe.
'The fatal document started for Berlin on the evening of July 4. Count Hoyos, Berchtold's Chief of Cabinet, carried it. The next day, July 5, Emperor Francis Joseph gave a long audience to the Chief of Staff, Conrad, who left an exact report of the conversation:
'“I expressed”, wrote Conrad, “my opinion of the inevitability of war with Serbia.”
“The Emperor: Yes, that's perfectly true, but how do you expect to make war if everyone attacks us, especially Russia?
“Conrad: Doesn't Germany shield us?
“The Emperor: Are we sure about Germany?
“Conrad: But we ought to know, Your Majesty, the situation we are in.
“The Emperor: A note left last night for Berlin; we asked for a point-blank reply.
“Conrad: And if the reply assures that Germany places herself beside us, shall we make war on Serbia?
“The Emperor: In that case, yes.”'
(pp. 147-149)
'Three days after his meeting with Francis Joseph, on July 8, Conrad had a definitive conversation with Berchtold. The meticulous exactness with which Conrad reproduced it in his memoirs* is surprising; it is the language of a conspiracy, and he does not realize it. [*From footnote: 'Conrad's memoirs, Aus Meiner Dienstzeit (My Years of Service), has the advantage of sincerity where other writers, more anxious about public opinion, would have been tempted to gloss over the truth.']
'“Berchtold: What will happen if Serbia lets matters slide until the mobilization, and then yields completely?
“Conrad: Then we invade Serbian territory.
“Berchtold: And if Serbia does nothing?
“Conrad: Then Serbia will remain occupied until all our war expenses have been paid.
“Berchtold: Shall we delay the ultimatum until after the harvest, and after the Serajevo inquest?
“Conrad: Better to-day than to-morrow; we have to exploit the situation. The moment our adversaries suspect anything they are going to prepare.
“Berchtold: We'll take care that the secret will be strictly kept and that nothing shall be known by anyone.
“Conrad: About what date should the ultimatum be sent?
“Berchtold: In a fortnight, July 22. It would be a good idea for you, as well as for the Minister of War, to go on leave for a while so as to dissipate any kind of anxiety.”
'Such was the atmosphere at Vienna when Francis Ferdinand's assassination seemed the most fortunate of opportunities, one which had been lacking in 1913, and one that at no price should be missed again. Apponyi's “At last!” was the avowal of the official world. Those who hesitated, like Tisza, did not do so from love of peace, but because they were not sure of being sufficiently aided by Germany. The moment William II's “Now or never” became known at Vienna and Budapest, there was not a Magyar nor an Austrian-German who was not for the war. At the time of the dramatic interview that took place on November 2, 1918, between the members of the Deutschoesterreicher Staatsrat and Emperor Charles, when the latter protested “not having wanted it” and a Socialist leader indicated approbation, the old Christian-Socialist Dr. Mayer rose and, alone, had the dignity to declare:
'“Let us be sincere, gentlemen. We all wanted the war: even the people wanted it. You need only recall the enthusiasm of the summer of 1914. . . .”' (pp. 149-150)
* * *
'A legend more tenacious than history was formed in 1914 and afterward regarding Pope Pius X's attitude toward the Hapsburg aggression toward Serbia. This legend shows us Pius X praying and fighting against the outbreak of the war, horrified to see Christianity divided into two enemy camps, and dying of grief at the invasion of Belgium and all the horrors of war unchained. The truth is quite otherwise.
'During the war of 1914-18 the religious question had only a minor importance; both camps included Catholics, Protestants, Greek Orthodox members and Mohammedans. Catholic unity did not prevail any more than Mohammedan unity, which seemed so sure of its jihad (the Holy War proclaimed by the Sultan-Caliph, which neither Arab nor Hindu [Indian?] Moslem obeyed). The clergy of the different countries could all invoke Allah or the old God of Armies with opposite hopes.
'One fact, however, during the tragic weeks of July and August, 1914, scandalized European opinion: that the war should have been provoked in the name of God by a powerful and decrepit sovereign, Francis Joseph, Emperor of Austria and Apostolic King of Hungary, the most Catholic of all the sovereigns and the most important of all Catholic sovereigns. When this Prince declared that he made war to chastise Serbia, millions of timorous souls imagined that the Pope would intervene to prevent the catastrophe. This hope gave birth to the legend. It was said at the time that Pius X, the moment he knew of the ultimatum to Serbia, had enjoined his Nuncio at Vienna to admonish the old Emperor and King in the name of the Almighty. Then, since the war happened just the same, it was explained that the Ballplatz diplomats and military men of the imperial entourage had prevented Pius X's messenger from talking with the Emperor. And here is the last act of the legend: The Pope having died suddenly on August 20, 1914, it was affirmed that the good Pius had succumbed to grief, having realized his impotence to avert the disaster.
'It is time to establish the truth as to that legend, and here it is:
'As soon as the danger of war became evident, Count Palffy, Austrian Chargé d' Affaires at the Vatican, several times informed Pius X's Secretary of State, Cardinal Merry del Val, of the intentions and the “duties” of the Dual Monarchy. The Cardinal's replies were deposited in the diplomatic correspondence of the Austro-Hungarian Embassy, correspondence that I have seen. They reveal that the Vatican saw with satisfaction, at least at the outset, an undertaking in which the crushing of Serbia would entail a diminution of the influence of Russia. The latter's prestige was detested by the Roman Church, which viewed it as the principal obstacle to a reconciliation of the Oriental churches with the See of Rome. In these conversations the Secretary of State spoke expressly in the name of the Pope who, he declared to the Austrian representative, deplored that Austria had not earlier inflicted on the Serbs the chastisement they deserved. It is sufficient to quote the following passage from a dispatch of Count Palffy to Count Berchtold on July 29:
'“During the conversation I had two days ago with the Cardinal Secretary of State he spoke spontaneously of the great problems and questions now agitating Europe. It would be impossible to detect in His Eminence's words any spirit whatever of indulgence and conciliation. It is true he characterized the note to Serbia as very harsh, but he nevertheless approved it without any reservation and at the same time expressed, in an indirect way, the hope that the Monarchy would go to the limit. Certainly, added the Cardinal, it was too bad that Serbia had not been humiliated very much sooner, for then it might have been done without putting into play, as today, such immense possibilities. This declaration also corresponds to the Pope's way of thinking, for, in the course of recent years His Holiness has often expressed regret that Austro-Hungary has failed to 'chastise' her dangerous Danubian neighbour.
'“One might wonder for what motive the Catholic Church evinces herself so bellicose at an epoch when she is governed by a chief who is truly a saint, imbued with veritably apostolic ideas. The answer is very simple. The Pope and the Curia see in Serbia the ravaging malady that little by little penetrated the Monarchy to the marrow, and which, in time, would end by disintegrating it.
'“Despite all the other experiments attempted by the Curia in the course of the last decade, Austria-Hungary is and remains the Catholic State par excellence, the strongest rampart of the Faith which stands in our day for the Church of Christ. The fall of this rampart would signify for the Church the loss of its solidest prop; in the conflicts with the Orthodox Church she would see her most powerful champion struck down.
'“Hence, just as for Austria-Hungary there is an immediate necessity of self-preservation to expel from its organism, even by force if need be, the dissolving malady, there is also for the Catholic Church an indirect necessity of doing or approving everything that would serve to attain that end.
'“In this light, a harmony between the apostolic sentiment and the war spirit can easily be confirmed.”
'The widening of the conflict which from Austro-Serb became European changed probably the Pope's frame of mind. But at least in the very first days of the war he considered the march of the German army nach Paris as a punishment that God had inflicted on the “eldest daughter of the Church” who had given him the worst worries of his pontificate.' (pp. 153-155).
[The above paragraph in the American edition published by E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York, 1944 (by the same translators: Drake and Denise de Kay) reads slightly differently; as here follows:
'The widening of the conflict which from Austro-Serb became European did not do much to change the Pope's frame of mind. In his honest but narrow mind the march of the German army nach Paris assumed the form of a punishment that God had inflicted on the “eldest daughter of the Church” who had given him the worst worries of his pontificate.' (p. 189).]
'We have seen that the proceeding of the Nuncio at Vienna is a legend. That Pius X died of grief is still another. I have it from his doctor, my colleague in the Italian Senate, that the malady of which the Pope died had for long months wasted the old man by slow degrees, and that the overwork of the last few weeks could, at most, but have hastened the end that he, Marchiafava, had already declared inevitable and due to occur very shortly.' (p. 155)
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