ARMAGEDDON: The Vatican Against Europe

(A cartoon of Pope Pius X, and Cardinal Merry del Val, From L'ASINO, 6 June 1909, As reproduced in The Papal Conquest)

In his work Hitler's Pope: The Secret History of Pius XII, John Cornwell writes:

'When Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife were gunned down by a pan-Serbian agitator in Sarajevo on June 28, [1914] the emotions prompted by the Serbian Concordat [signed between the Vatican and Serbia a few days earlier on June 24, 1914] became part of the general groundswell of anti-Serbian anger. The concordant nevertheless represented a contribution to the tensions that led the Austrian government to overplay its hand by delivering a humiliating ultimatum to Serbia. There is no indication that Pope Pius X grasped the role of the Holy See in adding to the pressures that brought the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Serbia to the brink. The declaration of war, it is said, threw him into a profound depression from which he never recovered. He died on August 20, 1914 – of a broken heart, it was said.'

(Hitler's Pope; American paperback edition – Penguin Books, 1999, 2000; pp. 57-58).

In a later post I'd like to give some details of the Vatican-Serbian Concordant of June 1914 – but firstly, concerning the claim that Pius X died of 'a broken heart' soon after the outbreak of war:

That this is the official 'version' can be adduced from the following, which is written in the Concise Holy History used in parochial catechisms:

'Pius X did all he could to prevent the war of 1914 and died of grief when he foresaw the evils it was about to unleash.'

Count Carlo Sforza, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Italy, in a chapter on 'The Origins of the [First World] War', in his Contemporary Italy: Its Intellectual and Moral Origins (1944/6) calls the rumour of Pius X succumbing to grief at his 'impotence to advert the disaster' of the war, as: 'A legend more tenacious than history'. And then to, 'establish the truth as to that legend', he quotes extensively from official letters deposited in the diplomatic correspondence of the Austro-Hungarian Embassy – correspondence that he himself had seen.

In a double posting for the start of this month, I include excerpts from the relevant chapter of Count Sforza's work in a seperate post below this one. The majority of the post appearing here, under the subheading, The Vatican Against Europe, is culled from a book of the same name by Edmund Paris, which was originally published in France in 1959, under the title, Le Vatican contre l'Europe; and was later translated into English by A. Robson and published as, The Vatican Against Europe; reprinted, 1988, 1993, by The Wickliffe Press (Protestant Truth Society) with a Preface by the Rev. Dr. Alan C. Clifford, B.A., M.Litt., Ph.D.

Concerning Pius X and the outbreak of war, Edmund Paris writes:

'Pierre Dominique, [in La politique des Jésuites (Grasset, Paris 1955, pp. 245-246)] on the authority of Count Sforza's Memoirs and of diplomatic documents, shows how far the Vatican was from considering conciliation [during the events that would initiate the First World War]:

'“. . . We have access to a certain number of documents”, continues Pierre Dominique, “whose analysis shows beyond doubt that, at least in the beginning, the Vatican looked with satisfaction upon a venture in which the crushing of Serbia would have entailed a decrease in the influence of Russia, whose prestige the Roman Church detested. . . . In these conversations the Secretary of State [Cardinal Merry del Val] spoke explicitly in the name of the Pope, who, he informed the Austrian representative, deplored the fact that Austria had not before this inflicted upon the Serbs the punishment they deserved.”

'Indeed the despatch of 29 July 1914 from Count Palffy, Austrian Chargé d' Affaires at the Vatican, to Count Berchtold, Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, leaves no doubt that Pope Pius X and the Curia wanted war. Here is the Document [Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für neuere Geschichte Österreichs, 26 Wien–Leipzig 1930, pp. 893 and 894]:

'“In times of extreme political tension such as those we are now going through, human fantasy runs away with itself, redoubles its intensity and soon goes beyond the limits of common sense. Thus the last few days there has again been a rumour that Pope Pius X has intervened in the Serbian conflict and had been in touch with His Apostolic Imperial Majesty, entreating him to spare the Christian nations the horrors of war. An argument based on such absurd premises is of course bound to lead to the conclusion, as logical as it is erroneous, that there was in fact intervention by the Pope. The real opinion of the Curia is not without interest. When, two days ago, I went to the Cardinal Secretary of State, he did, of course, speak about the serious questions and problems that at present preoccupy the whole of Europe. His Eminence's conversation bore no sign of any particular goodwill or moderation. He unreservedly approved the note addressed to Serbia, and he indirectly expressed the hope the Monarchy would hold out to the end. 'It goes without saying', remarked the Cardinal, 'that it is regrettable that Serbia should not have been brought low a long time ago.' This declaration is equally consonant with the Pope's opinion: many a time during the past year His Holiness has expressed his regret that Austria-Hungary should have missed the opportunity to subdue its Danubian neighbour”.

'Austria's representative at the Vatican then endeavours to justify the attitude of Pope Pius X with arguments which, according to Pierre Dominique, [op. cit., pp. 247 and 248] Count Sforza reports in these terms:

'“One might well ask oneself why the Catholic Church adopts such a bellicose attitude. The answer is very simple. The Pope and the Curia see in Serbia a consuming disease which, little by little, has penetrated to the very marrow of the Monarchy and which, in time, would end by disintegrating it . . . Austria-Hungary is and remains the Catholic state par excellence, the strongest buttress of religion that is now left to the Church. For the Church the fall of this buttress would mean the loss of her strongest support; she would see the fall of her most devoted champion in the battle against Orthodoxy . . . In the light of this fact, it is not difficult to forge a link between the apostolic feelings and the spirit of war.”' (ibid. pp.43-45).

At this point, it seems appropriate, for a moment, to break away from Edmund Paris' work and to reflect on the words of Christopher Wordsworth, D.D. (The nephew of the poet 'Wordsworth'; and at the time of the work to be cited below's writing, Canon of Westminster – and later, Anglican Bishop of Lincoln). Though the 'Orthodoxy' that he writes about below, should not be assumed to be that of the 'Eastern' variety, he writes thus – concerning the 'three unclean spirits like frogs', that in Revelation ch. 16; v. 13-16 gather 'the kings of the earth' to the great 'battle' (more properly, 'war') which is styled in the Apocalypse, 'Armageddon' :

'As the Psalmist says, describing the plagues of Egypt, the land brought forth Frogs, even in their Kings' chambers [Ps. cv. 30.]. . . . Such is the Plague which St. John announces to the World in the Sixth Vial. He represents it as issuing from the mouth of the Dragon, – the Devil – and of the Beast, and of the False Prophet.

'Thus he foretels that the Papacy, distressed by the ebbing of its strength . . . will hate Orthodoxy worse than Scepticism, and will endeavour to persuade mankind that they cannot be Christians unless they are Papists, and thus will do the Dragon's work, and promote Infidelity. He portends that Roman Preachers, Ministers of the False Prophet, will advocate doctrines of political licentiousness, and flatter Rulers and Nations with seducing words . . .'

(From: Lectures on the Apocalypse; Critical, Expository, and Practical; Delivered Before the University of Cambridge; Third Edition, 1852; pp. 387-388).

Returning back to Edmund Paris' work he continues:

'To [the] overwhelming document [already cited above] may be added another, no less official . . . In July 1913, after the signature of the Peace of Bucarest, Austria-Hungary was already threatening to attack Serbia, and it was the turn of the Austrian prince Schönburg to go and acquaint himself with the feeling of the Vatican on the subject. This is how he reports [Document P.A. XI/291] to Count Berchtold the conversations that he had there at the end of October and on 3 November 1913:

'“Among the first subjects tackled by the Cardinal Secretary of State during our interview last week, as was to be expected, was the question of Serbia. The Cardinal began by expressing his joy at the energetic and commendable attitude which we have recently adopted. During today's audience (upon which I have made a separate report, see document A), His Holiness, who began the interview by mentioning the energetic step we have taken at Belgrade, made several very characteristic remarks. 'Certainly,' then said His Holiness, 'Austria-Hungary would have done better to punish the Serbs for all the mistakes that have been made.'” (pp. 45-46).

To set the above dispatch within its historical context, I quote now from J'Accuse! 'By A German' (Richard Grelling); and translated by Alexander Gray, and published by Hodder and Stoughton, 1915 :

GIOLITTI'S REVELATIONS.

'It is known that, soon after the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Austrian Government proposed to take military measures against the growing Great-Serbian movement, which had been produced as a result of the annexation. This was an act of criminal insanity on the part of Austria; it was a crime, because here the violator intended to punish the violated because he resisted violation; it was insane, because national tendencies cannot be suppressed by force of arms. But the wise men of Austria thought otherwise. Serbia was threatened with war, and only through the submission of Russia and the mediation of England and Germany was it possible to prevent, by means of a propitiatory declaration on the part of Serbia, the European war which even then threatened to break out. That was in March, 1909, and is known to everyone. What, however, was not known, and has only become known by the revelations of Giolitti [the Italian Prime Minister] on December 5th, 1914, in the Italian Chamber, is the fact that Austria entertained in August, 1913, the same intentions as in 1909, and was prevented from giving effect to these intentions only by the opposition of Italy.

'These revelations of Giolitti have rightly been regarded in the whole of the foreign Press as epoch-making, because they revealed in an incontestable manner the aggressive intentions of Austria. But precisely for these reasons the German and Austrian Governments have preserved, with regard to these revelations, a silence as of death. There is therefore all the more reason why I should in this place once more awaken the dead to life.

'In midsummer, 1913, after the second Balkan War, the relations in the Balkans between those States immediately concerned were regulated by the Treaty of Bucharest. Austria-Hungary was not satisfied with the arrangement to which effect was given, since in her view Serbia had got too much and Bulgaria too little. She aimed at accomplishing a revision of the Treaty and in view of Serbia's opposition resolved to give effect to her desires by arms. For this purpose she naturally required the support of the Powers of the Triple Alliance and above all of Italy, who had always claimed the right to make her influence felt in the settlement of the Balkan question. The concurrence of the allied Powers in military action against Serbia was, however, regarded as necessary by Austria chiefly, because the Austrian Government was even then fully aware of the fact that a war with Serbia must lead to a European struggle. Austria consequently addressed inquiries to Italy with a view to ascertaining what her attitude would be in view of her duties under the Triple Alliance in the event of a Serbian, and, should it arise, a European war. As a result of the Austrian inquiry the following exchange of telegrams took place between the Foreign Minister, Di San Giuliano, and the Prime Minister, Giolitti, who was then absent: “Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her intention of taking action against Serbia, and defines such action as defensive, hoping to bring into operation the casus fœderis of the Triple Alliance, which, on the contrary, I believe to be inapplicable. I am endeavouring to arrange for a combined effort with Germany to prevent such action on the part of Austria, but it may become necessary to state clearly that we do not consider such action, if it should be taken, as defensive, and that, therefore, we do not consider that the casus fœderis arises. Please telegraph to me at Rome if you approve.”

'Giolitti replied to this: “If Austria intervenes against Serbia it is clear that a casus fœderis cannot be established. It is a step which she is taking on her own account since there is no question of defence inasmuch as no one is thinking of attacking her. It is necessary that a declaration to this effect should be made to Austria in the most formal manner, and we must hope for action on the part of Germany to dissuade Austria from this most perilous adventure (pericolosissima avventura).”

'On this occasion success, in fact, attended the task of restraining Austria from a war against Serbia, but whether this was due to Germany's efforts or to Italy's opposition is not known. What, however, is to-day of the highest interest is the fact that, even a year before the outbreak of the present war, Austria was firmly resolved to initiate, without any urgent reason, a military conflict with Serbia, for there was then no question of the death of an Archduke . . .' (J'Accuse!; pp. 121-124).

Concerning these tumultuous times, and the first Balkan War, Joseph Goricar, formerly of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Service, recounts:

'[L]eaflets were circulated, through the agency of our Socialists, among the Polish workmen throughout Russian Poland urging them, when called to the colours on the outbreak of hostilities, to destroy as far as possible all military materials, to “spoil everything that could aid the Russian armies in their advance,” and above all, “to let themselves be taken prisoners.” The all-Polish organ, Slowo Polskie of Lwow, capital of Galicia, published an article which concluded with these words: “In holding before its eyes the reconstruction of the Kingdom of Poland, the Polish nation must hold itself in readiness for war at any moment.” These anti-Russian and pro-German protestations occurred at the very time when the forcible expropriation of Polish estates in the German Ostmark was at its height. In this campaign the Socialist, Polish, Jewish, and Pan-German press was ably supported by organs controlled by the Vatican. Among these the Oesterreichs Katholische Sonntags Blatt came out at the beginning of the first Balkan war with this declaration:

'“Our ideal is not to perpetuate European Turkey, but to bring the Balkan Peninsula into the possession of Catholic Austria and the Catholic Church.” This ideal was thus defended in their issue of October 27th :

“Just as a violent storm refreshes and cleanses the oppressive atmosphere, so we hold when it once comes to real war the moral and economic gain to Europe will in the end be very great. The social democracy is not yet strong enough to prevent a war. As a result of the emotional pressure of a European war it will break to pieces with its millions of casual followers, and under the same pressure modern liberalism will also break down. It will not hurt Europe if its conditions are for once well shaken up.”'

(From: The Inside Story of Austro-German Intrigue, or, How the World War Was Brought About, by Joseph Goricar, Formerly of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Service, and Lyman Beecher Stowe; published Garden City New York, Doubleday, Page & Company, 1920; pp. 94-95).

After which, it seems fitting to reappraise the following words that appear in Dr. Andrew D. White's Autobiography (vol. ii. pp. 349-351); as quoted in the Rev. Alexander Robinson's, The Papal Conquest; words that issued forth from the mouth of a man, whom Dr. White (of Cornell University, and late Ambassador at Berlin of the United States of America; and President of the American Delegation at the Hague Conference, 1899) described as being, 'a leading Roman Catholic diplomat who represented one of the great Catholic Powers'; here again are some of that statesman's incriminating sentiments as expressed to Dr. White after the Hague Conference:

'The Vatican has always been, and is to-day, a storm-centre. The Pope and his advisers have never hesitated to urge on war, no matter how bloody, when the slightest of their ordinary worldly purposes could be served by it. . . . Their whole policy is based on stirring up hatred and promoting conflicts from which they hope to draw worldly advantage.' (p. 315).

Before returning back to Edmund Paris' work – so as to give, again, some of the historical background to the final official document he quotes from – a quick return back to Richard Grelling's J'Accuse! supplies us with the following information:

'The indictment to be brought against the Empires of Germany and Austria is that in the summer of 1914 they intentionally brought about the war which they had long prepared and desired, because they thought that the moment was specially favourable for striking the blow. This time the occasion of the dispute was not, as in previous years, a paltry territorial question in the Balkans, a squabble about a harbour or a stretch of sea-shore, questions which could neither arouse public interest nor kindle the enthusiasm of nations. The issue raised on this occasion related to the murder of an Arch-Duke and his Consort, a tragic event which was bound to awaken the indignation of the whole world, and, so they calculated, could not fail to enlist universal sympathy on behalf of the Powers who appeared as the avengers of such a crime.

'Thus, in the first place, the moral advantage was on their side. But they believed that they could also rely on a similar military advantage. Certain matters just about this time had come to light which were regarded as proving the disorganisation of the French and the defective preparation of the Russian army. The revelations of Senator Humbert had just made public the existence of serious defects in the French Army, and it was believed that the Russian Army, quite apart from its defective equipment, was still required to cope with internal unrest and weakened by civil dissensions. England's neutrality was still hoped for, in spite of previous failures in this direction, and the Italians were thought to be foolish enough to draw the chestnuts out of the fire in the Balkans for the hated Austrian, and to risk their whole national existence “pour le roi de Prusse.”

'All this was a complete miscalculation. But as the art of calculation was not understood in Berlin and Vienna, it was thought that the moment was favourable for striking – and they struck.' (pp. 136-137).

Returning, finally, back to The Vatican Against Europe – and in the light of the official documents thus far perused in his work – Edmund Paris continues:

'Far be it from us to question the good faith of the Holy Father's apologists. At the same time, we cannot help asking by what miracle are his unequivocal appeals for war transformed, in their eyes, into appeals for peace? Let us confess in all humility that we are unable to explain this fantastic state of affairs. But no matter: we have now established, beyond all possible question, with official records, the way in which Pius X “did all he could to prevent the war of 1914”.

'Might it be said, nevertheless, in an attempt to excuse him, that he was hoping to see the conflict limited to Austria-Hungary and Serbia? Let us hear the pious René Bazin, of the Académie française, another author who cannot be suspected of bias against the Vatican [who wrote in Pie X (Flammarion, Paris 1928, pp. 88 and 89)]:

'“Pius X ruled the Church from 4 August 1903 to 20 August 1914. On 2 June of that year, he entered his eightieth year. The war was approaching. He had foreseen this upheaval of the world; he had more than once said to Cardinal Merry del Val, who used to bring him diplomatic despatches and other papers of the previous day, whenever he was explaining some serious question:

'“What is that, compared with what is to come? The Great War is coming: 1914 will not be over before it breaks out.

'“To the Minister of Brazil, who was taking leave of him, Pius X said: 'You are fortunate', the Pope told him, 'you will not see the Great War at close quarters.'

'“The diplomat, struck by this remark, wrote to several of his friends about it. Less than three months later, five nations were mobilising their armies, and Germany was invading Belgium.”

'Can it be maintained, after this, that the Holy Father did not foresee the extension of the conflict? On the contrary, he foresaw it so well, that he expressly mentioned it before a diplomat, during an interview recorded in another official document which is quoted by Count Sforza and Pierre Dominique:

“The day before, on 26 July [1914], Baron Ritter, Chargé d' Affaires of Bavaria at the Holy See, had written to his Government:

“The Pope approves of Austria's harsh treatment of Serbia. He has no great opinion of the armies of Russia and France in the event of a war against Germany. The Cardinal Secretary of State does not see when Austria could make war if she does not decide to do so now.”

[Author's Note: This despatch from Baron Ritter appears in, Bayerische Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch, III (Bavarian Documents on the Outbreak of War), p. 206.]

'“The authenticity of these two texts has been acknowledged after many debates in the Catholic press . . .” notes Pierre Dominique [La politique des Jésuites, pp. 248 and 250]. “The key to the question maintains Count Sforza, along with a few others, was the necessity of converting Francis Joseph to the idea of war. The opinions of the Pope and his minister were certainly the most likely to influence him. Hence the despatch of Count Palffy. . . .” (pp. 46-47).

' . . . Thus, it is proved that Pius X and his Secretary of State, when they encouraged the most Catholic Emperor to make war, were coldly contemplating the consequences of their act: a general conflict which would set the Central European Empires against France and Russia. They believed they had accurately estimated the strength of the different forces involved.

'But, what His Holiness and his accomplice had not foreseen was the participation in the war of England and finally of the entire Anglo-Saxon world, a participation which was to thwart their plans, tip the scales in favour of France and liberate the Orthodox populations from the Viennese yoke.

* * *

'Hence the responsibility for the crime is beyond doubt – an enormous crime which, over a period of four years, was to throw into the charnel-house millions of “Christian” corpses, all the flower of European youth, and a crime all the more odious for being completely premeditated.

'One may say quite specifically that in 1914, the Roman Church started the series of hellish wars. It was then that the tribute of blood which she has always taken from the people began to swell into a veritable torrent.' (pp. 47-48).

Envoi

'[O]ne feels that it is impiety or culpable ignorance to talk, as so many do, of the Pope being the Vicar of the Prince of Peace, and of the Roman Catholic Church as having a mission of peace and of goodwill to mankind. He [the Pope] is, on the contrary, the Vicar of Christ's Adversary [Satan], [who is] “The Prince of this World”; [John xii. 31, xiv. 30.] he [the Pope] is the “Beast” of the Revelation, to whom the “Dragon” [Satan] gave “his power, and his seat, and great authority . . . to make war with the saints.” [Rev. xiii. 2, 7.]'

Rev. Alexander Robertson, D.D., The Papal Conquest (1909), p. 316.