Showing posts with label Russia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Russia. Show all posts

Saturday, 31 March 2012

“Gott mit uns”?

The first work quoted below was published whilst the First World War was still raging:

‘Houston Chamberlain, one of the best known of [the popular German writers, has written] . . . a ponderous compilation entitled Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts [The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century], for which he is said to have been paid a large sum out of the privy purse by his appreciative Emperor. This work gratifies German pride beyond all measure, and has therefore been very successful, though as a matter of fact, the author's views are not at all original. In a fawning way he reiterates the statements that Germany is the foremost of nations, and bitterly regrets that in former invasions:

“The Teuton has not exterminated his enemies root and branch wherever he has stretched out his conquering arm . . .”

‘The traditional methods for organizing conquest are [seen as being] rather slow, and so an ingenious professor by the name of Vierordt has written an article for the Badische Landeszeitung [‘Baden State Newspaper’] to show the urgent necessity of killing off Germany's enemies by the million in order that conquered territories may be transformed into deserts, to be populated subsequently by virtuous Germans.

‘These publications give most interesting indications with regard to the mentality of their authors, who long for a far more complete destruction of Europe that that which took place in Attila's day. [And who] would no doubt organize the unravished portions of the Continent into immense factories, where the unsparing lash of the Prussian corporal would keep millions of serfs toiling to enrich the Germans in general and the professors in particular.’

(From: The Psychology of the Great War, by Gustave Le Bon, translated by E. Andrews; published New York, The Macmillan Company, 1916. pp. 164, 166).

In a chapter on ‘Kaiser Wilhelm II and German anti-semitism’ in one of his works on the Kaiser, John Röhl clarifies the different levels of anti-semitism suffered by the Jews in Germany between unification in 1871 and the Götterdämmerung of 1945. He classifies them as ranging from the first (lower) form being: ‘the anti-semitism of the salon, consisting of personal prejudice and collective but still informal discrimination’; and finally at the other extreme (number five): ‘there is the ultimate horror, the anti-semitism of extermination, the anti-semitism of the holocaust.’

And he then goes on to write that: ‘In examining the anti-semitism of Kaiser Wilhelm II, we shall need to be mindful of these five different types of anti-semitism. The baneful truth, however, is that at one time or another in the course of his long life he subscribed to all five.’

Röhl writes that after his abdication and flight to exile in Holland the Kaiser wrote the following to General August von Mackensen on 2 December 1919:

“The deepest, most disgusting shame ever perpetrated by a people in history, the Germans have done onto themselves. Egged on and misled by the tribe of Juda whom they hated, who were guests among them! That was their thanks! Let no German ever forget this, nor rest until these parasites have been destroyed and exterminated [vertilgt und ausgerottet] from German Soil! This poisonous mushroom on the German oak-tree!”

Röhl then goes on:

‘He [the Kaiser] called for a ‘regular international all-worlds pogrom à la Russe’ as ‘the best cure’. ‘Jews and Mosquitoes’ were ‘a nuisance that humanity must get rid of in some way or other’, he proclaimed, and added, again in his own hand: ‘I believe the best would be gas!’ [From notes: ‘Kaiser Wilhelm II to Poultney Bigelow, 15 August 1929. Bigelow Papers, New York Public Library. Two years earlier, Wilhelm had instructed a member of his entourage to ask Fritz Haber whether the Totalvergasung [‘Total Gasification’] of large cities had become a practicable possibility. Wilhelm von Dommes to Fritz Haber, 14 June 1927, Gutssche, Ein Kaiser im Exil, p. 92.’]

(From: The Kaiser and His Court: Wilhelm II and the Government of Germany, by John C. G. Röhl, Cambridge University Press, 1994 [originally published in Germany as Kaiser, Hof und Staat: Wilhelm II. Und die deutsche Politik by Verlag C. H. Beck, Munich 1987]; p. 194-195, p. 210, and notes p. 266).

In line with extremist Germanic thought of the time the Kaiser didn’t envision genocide as being solely reserved and warranted by the Jews as Röhl writes:

‘In September 1914, after the German victory at Tannenberg, the Kaiser proposed that the 90,000 Russian prisoners of war be driven onto a barren spit of land in the Baltic and kept there till they died of thirst and hunger: it was left to one of his generals to point out that that would be ‘genocide’.’ [From notes: ‘Admiral Georg Alexander von Müller, diary entry for 4 September 1914, BA-MA Freiburg. This entry was omitted in Walter Görlitz (ed.), Regierte der Kaiser? Kreigstagebücher, Aufzeichnungen und Briefe des Chefs des Marine-Kabinetts Admiral Georg Alexander von Müller 1914-1918 (Göttingen 1959), pp. 54f.’] (ibid. p. 207, and notes p. 229)

The following is from a late eighteenth-century work first published in 1796:

'Thus the wars, in which the tyrants of the European world are to be subdued, with their widely scattered partisans, being of such mighty influence in deciding the condition of the human race, are foretold, in several parts of the apocalypse, and under different emblems. Such appears to be the import of THE HARVEST and THE VINTAGE, described in the xivth chapter [of the Revelation].’

According to this prophetic interpretation the subduing of these ‘tyrants of the European world’ (also being ‘the enemies of the church and the adversaries of [God’s] people’) would consist of:

‘two most signal slaughters, between which some space of time would intervene, which agreeably to analogy may be represented by the interval, which separates a harvest from a vintage.’

During the second of these ‘two most signal slaughters’ the grapes are described not just as being solely ‘ripe’ but as now being ‘fully ripe’. To continue from the quoted work:

‘The symbolic grapes are described as fully ripe “That is,” says Vitringa, “the period of the divine forbearance had expired, and villanies, no longer to be tolerated, had arisen to their utmost height. The measure of crimes was filled up. — Punishment therefore could no longer be deferred, but the destroyers of the earth were at length to be destroyed, and were in their turn to meet with their reward.” ’

(From: Illustrations of Prophecy, by the Rev Joseph Towers; published London, MDCCXCVI [1796]*. pp. 298, 300).

*For lengthier quotes from this work by the Rev Joseph Towers see the World War Armageddon blog posts ‘The two world wars; & the “Harvest of the earth”, from April 2010; and ‘The best laid schemes of FROGS and men . . .’ from March 2010.

Monday, 2 January 2012

Das Ritter Telegramm

The following post is a fuller translation of “The Ritter Telegram” from Bavarian Documents to the Outbreak of War and the Versailles Verdict, on behalf of the Bavarian State Parliament, ed. by Dr. P. Dirr; from the 1924 edition (p. 206).

“Das Ritter Telegramm

“Der bayerische Gesandte beim Vatikan, Herr von Ritter, sandte am 24. Juli 1914 folgende Chiffredepesche an die Münchener Regierung:

Telegramm Nr. 216. Rom, den 24. Juli 1914, 18 Uhr 35 Min.

Papst billigt scharfes Vorgehen Österreichs gegen Serbien und schätzt im Kriegsfalle mit Rußland russische und französische Armee nicht hoch ein. Kardinalsekretär hofft ebenfalls, daß Österreich diesmal durchhält und wüßte nicht, wan es sonst noch Krieg führen wollte, wenn es nicht einmal eine ausländische Agitation, die zum Morde Thronfolgers geführt hat und außerdem bei jetziger Konstellation Österreichs Existenz gefährdet, entschlossen ist, mit den Waffen zurückzuweisen. Daraus spricht auch die große Angst der Kurie vor dem Panslavismus.

Ritter.”

{The Pope} {approves} {sharp/harsh} {proceedings/action/approach} {Austria} {against} {Serbia} {and} {estimates} {in the} {event of war} {with} {Russia} {Russian} {and} {French} {army} {not} {high} {one}. {Cardinal Secretary} {hopes} {likewise}, {that} {Austria} {this time}
{holds out/perseveres} {and} {intuited} {not}, {when} {it} {at other time} {still} {war} {conduct} {want/desire} {if} {it} {not} {once} {a} {foreign} {agitation}, {the} {to} {murder} {heir apparent/Archduke} {led} {has} {and} {in addition/as well} {at} {of present}
{political situation} {Austria’s} {existence} {endangered/threatened} {determined} {is}, {with} {the} {arms/weapons}
{must reject/point back to/repel}. {From this} {speaks} {also} {the} {great} {fear} {the} {curia} {before} {the} {Pan-Slavism}.

{Ritter}.

FULL TRANSLATION:

The Bavarian Envoy to the Vatican, Herr von Ritter, sent the following encrypted telegram to the Munich Government on 24 July 1914:

Telegram No. 216, Rome, 24 July 1914, 18 H 35 min.

The Pope approves of Austria’s harsh treatment of Serbia. He has no great opinion of the armies of Russia and France in the event of war. The Cardinal Secretary of State hopes likewise that this time Austria will hold firm; and intuited that he could not see a more desirable time for Austria to make war if she does not do so now in the face of such foreign agitation, which has led to the murder of the Archduke and also to the present political situation which threatens Austria’s very existence - unless she determines to repel this threat by force of arms. Also, from my discussions: it is evident that the great fear amongst the Roman Curia is that of Pan-Slavism.

Ritter.

Sunday, 24 July 2011

Bavarian Documents on the Outbreak of War

Das Ritter Telegramm

“Der bayerische Gesandte beim Vatikan, Herr von Ritter, sandte am 24. Juli 1914 folgende Chiffredepesche an die Münchener Regierung:

Telegramm Nr. 216. Rom, den 24. Juli 1914, 18 Uhr 35 Min.

Papst billigt scharfes Vorgehen Österreichs gegen Serbien und schätzt im Kriegsfalle mit Rußland russische und französische Armee nicht hoch ein. Kardinalsekretär hofft ebenfalls, daß Österreich diesmal durchhält und wüßte nicht, wan es sonst noch Krieg führen wollte, wenn es nicht einmal eine ausländische Agitation, die zum Morde Thronfolgers geführt hat und außerdem bei jetziger Konstellation Österreichs Existenz gefährdet, entschlossen ist, mit den Waffen zurückzuweisen. Daraus spricht auch die große Angst der Kurie vor dem Panslavismus.

Ritter.”

(From: Bavarian Documents to the Outbreak of War and the Versailles Verdict, on behalf of the Bavarian State Parliament, ed. by Dr. P. Dirr; 1925 edition, p. 206)

Partial translation of the above as it appears in The Vatican Against Europe:

“The Pope [Pius X] approves of Austria's harsh treatment of Serbia. He has no great opinion of the armies of Russia and France in the event of a war against Germany. The Cardinal Secretary of State [Cardinal Merry del Val] does not see when Austria could make war if she does not decide to do so now.”

[Author's Note: This despatch from Baron Ritter appears in, Bayerische Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch, III, p. 206.]

Sunday, 27 March 2011

“Drang nach osten”: Germany’s drive to the East

(Above: front cover of H Charles Woods' The Danger Zone: Changes and Problems in the Near East, 1911; and below: the title-page of his later work The Cradle of the War: The Near East and Pan-Germanism, 1918).

This post continues on from the theme of the previous post from February concerning the conflict between the “King of the Earth” (Germany and the Central Powers) and the “Kings of the East” (or “sun-rising”: the British Empire with its “jewel in the crown” centered on India).

First from a work I cited from in a post from last year (in the Archive for May 2010 on the World War Armageddon blog):

‘Let us now review our position, and see how we stand with regard to the events which we have shown to be foretold as destined to take place during the era of the sixth Vial in which we are now living. The drying up of the Euphrates has long been going on: the power of Turkey has long been declining. Our statesmen tell us “The Sick Man is sicker than ever.” In our daily papers we read: “The Ottoman Empire exhibits all the signs of a state in dissolution.”. . . Those evil agencies symbolised by the three frog-like spirits, which are yet to embroil the world, have began to show signs of increased activity. No one can deny that there is in the minds of thinking men, whose eyes are open to see the signs of the times, a presentiment that a great crises is approaching in the history of our world. There ever lingers on the horizon the dark storm-cloud of the Eastern Question. Now and again it seems gathering to a head, and threatening to burst. But, as often happens in thundery weather, the storm is averted for a while. Yet there the cloud is still, waiting for the time fixed by God's eternal decree, and when that time comes the cloud of the Eastern Question will once more gather and come down, involving the nations in widespread calamity and destruction. There can be little doubt that in the crises of the end of this dispensation the Eastern Question will play its part.’

(The Rev. Joseph Tanner, B.A.; from: Daniel and the Revelation: The Chart of Prophecy and our Place in it; A Study of the Historical and Futurist Interpretation; London; Hodder and Stoughton, 1898; p. 370).

Before moving on to quote from the latter work detailed above by H Charles Henry, the following quote is taken from H A Gibbons' The Reconstruction of Poland and the Near East, 1917 (pp. 57-58):

“Hemmed in on the west by Great Britain and France and on the east by Russia, born too late to extend their political sovereignty over vast colonial domains, and unable (if only for lack of coaling stations) to develop sea power greater than that of their rivals, nothing was more natural than the German and Austro-Hungarian conception of a Drang nach Osten through the Balkan Peninsula, over the bridge of Constantinople, into the markets of Asia. The geographical position of the Central European states made as inevitable a penetration policy into the Balkans and Turkey as the geographical position of England made inevitable the development of an overseas empire.”

(As cited in, Turkey, The Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway: A Study in Imperialism; by Edward Mead Earle, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of History in Columbia University; The Macmillan Company, New York, 1924; p. 51).

Now to H Charles Woods' work:

‘[First:] the reasons which have prompted me to call this book “The Cradle of the War.” For many years, and more especially since the re-establishment of the Ottoman Constitution in 1908, the numerous problems connected with the Near East have been a source of continual danger to the world's peace. This was due in part to the fact that the Balkan Peninsula and Asia Minor might at any time be the scenes of insurrection, massacre, or local conflict, and in part — a larger part — to the international rivalry which has existed for years concerning a future domination over many of the areas in question.

‘These localities, together with the waterways which they control, form the great and only corridor from west to east and from north to south, and they constitute the natural highway from Central Europe to Asia and from Russia to the Mediterranean. Thus, ever since the birth of her Mittel-Europa scheme, Germany has been determined to push open the Near-Eastern door, in order to be able to strike a deadly blow at the very vitals of the British Empire, and at the same time automatically to prevent Russia from expanding towards warm water. As I shall endeavour to show, therefore, it is not so much the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his Consort at Serajevo on June 28, 1914, as the developments preceding and following that occurrence which make the Near East the region of primary existence of the present conflict — the area in which many of its most important events have been sheltered and nurtured.

‘In the manner that a little cot is made ready for the expected child, so did the enemy prepare for the war which he was designing. This preparation, in progress from the time of the accession of the present [German] Emperor to the throne in 1888, was carried out by the gradual development of Germanic influence and power in Turkey, and by a constant and determined opposition to the establishment of stable conditions in the Near East. From the moment of the birth of his war child, too, the Kaiser has been an ever vigilant mother, for instead of allowing the real primary cause of the world conflict to be forgotten, he has consistently rocked the “cradle” in the apparent hope that she who performs this task rules the world.’

(From the Preface to The Cradle of the War: The Near East and Pan-Germanism; published: Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 1918; pp. ix-x).

‘Whilst the policies of England and Russia during the thirty years following the signature of the Treaty of Berlin may be described as those of procrastination, the Central Powers and particularly Germany were working and intriguing for the maintenance of a state of unrest in the East destined to prepare the way for the eventual realisation of their policies. Indeed, ever since the accession of the present Emperor to the throne in 1888 that rider has been carefully developing his influence in the East. One year later, and in 1889, His Majesty paid his first visit to Constantinople — a visit more or less connected with the then recent grabbing of the Scutari-Ismid railway and with the concession for the prolongation of that line to Angora as a German concern. Directly afterwards, early in 1890, by the “Dropping of the Pilot” there was in the retirement of Bismarck a clear reversal of the policy based upon the assertions of that statesman to the effect that the whole Eastern question was “not worth the bones of a Pomeranian Grenadier.” Before and particularly after the appointment of Baron Marshal von Bieberstein, who had then been a personal friend of the Kaiser's for many years, as Ambassador in Constantinople in 1897, Germanic policy was run with the sole object of securing concessions in and gaining the favour of Turkey. Indeed although so far as the Balkan States were concerned the Kaiser at this time endeavoured to screen his intentions behind a nominally Austrian programme, he was really preparing the way for the realisation of his Pan-German dreams in the Near and Middle Easts. Thus the power of Von der Goltz Pasha, who introduced the present military system into Turkey in 1886, and of his pupils was greatly increased until the Ottoman army was finally completely under Germanic control.’ (ibid. pp. 5-6)

And on a chapter on “Mittel Europa” H Charles Woods writes:

‘I have already dealt . . . with the question of German intrigues in the East prior to the out break of the War, that I propose here only briefly to refer to one or two points raised in the “Revelations of Prince Lichnowsky”, published in pamphlet form by The New York Times. To begin with, no doubt whatever is left upon the mind of the reader that Germany, and not Austria, made this War, largely with the object of improving her position in the East. Indeed from the time of the Congress of Berlin of 1878, when Prince Lichnowsky says his country began the Triple Alliance Policy, “The goal of our [German] political ambition was to dominate in the Bosphorus”, and “instead of encouraging a powerful development in the Balkan States, we [Germany] placed ourselves on the side of the Turkish and Magyar oppressors.”

‘These words contain in essence and in tabulated form an explanation of the Pan-German policy in progress during the period covered by this book — a policy the existence of which has often been refuted and denied by those who refused to see that, from the first, the Kaiser was obsessed by a desire for domination from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf. What is even more striking, too, is the fact that, in speaking of the Balkan War period, Prince Lichnowsky says, that “two possibilities for settling the question remained.” Either Germany left the Near-Eastern problem to the peoples themselves or she supported her allies “and carried out a Triple Alliance policy in the East, thereby giving up the rôle of mediator.” Once more, in the words of the Prince himself, “The German Foreign Office very much preferred the latter,” and as a result supported Austria . . .’ (ibid. pp. 312-313).

And from the same chapter concerning the “attention with which the Germans have developed their plans for conquest in the East”, H Charles Woods quotes the following:

“Their objective,” as President Wilson said in his address delivered at Baltimore on April 6, 1918, “is undoubtedly to make all the Slavic peoples, all the free and ambitious nations of the Balkan Peninsula, all the lands that Turkey has dominated and misruled, subject to their will and ambition and build upon that dominion an empire of force upon which they fancy that they can erect an empire of gain and commercial supremacy, — an empire as hostile to the Americas as to the Europe which it will overawe, — an empire which will ultimately master Persia, India, and the peoples of the Far East.” ’ (ibid. p. 320).

* * * * * * *

Envoi:

‘The war has been forced upon us, and yet we must look upon it as a stroke of good fortune that the sacrificial death of Archduke Francis Ferdinand led to the premature outbreak of the great anti-German conspiracy. Two years later the war would have been far more difficult, its victims more numerous, and its outcome less certain.’

(Paul Rohrbach, Professor of Colonial Economy in the Commercial Academy of Berlin, writing in the Author’s Preface to his Germany’s Isolation: An Exposition of the Economic Causes of the Great War, 1915).

And again:

‘Must [we] not fight for two hundred fifty million pounds of commerce.’ (Paul Rohrbach, quoting from the Saturday Review article ‘England and Germany(September, 1897) in his German World Policies, (p. 181), as cited in The Anglo-German Commercial and Colonial Rivalry as a Cause of The Great War; by Oscar Albert Marti, M.A.; The Stratford Company, Publishers, 1917; p. xiii).

The battle lines were joined:

‘[T]he merchants of Tarshish, with all the young lions thereof, shall say unto thee, Art thou come to take a spoil? hast thou gathered thy company to take a prey? to carry away silver and gold, to take away cattle and goods, to take a great spoil?’ Ezekiel 38:13

(For other posts on the “Kings of the East” click on the link in the Index below).

Friday, 14 January 2011

War 1914: Punishing the Serbs

Excerpts from official papers : –

'M.N. Pashitch, [Serbian] Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Royal Serbian Legations abroad.

Belgrade, June 18/July 1, 1914.

'The Austrian and Hungarian press are blaming Serbia more and more for the Sarajevo outrage. Their aim is transparent, viz., to destroy that high moral reputation which Serbia now enjoys in Europe, and to take the fullest advantage politically against Serbia of the act of a young and ill-balanced fanatic. But, in Serbia itself, the Sarajevo outrage has been most severely condemned in all circles of society, inasmuch as all, official as well as unofficial, immediately recognised that this outrage would be most prejudicial not only to our good neighbourly relations with Austria-Hungary but also to our co-nationalists in that country, as recent occurrences have proved. At a moment when Serbia is doing everything in her power to improve her relations with the neighbouring Monarchy, it is absurd to think that Serbia could have directly or indirectly inspired acts of this kind. On the contrary, it was of the greatest interest to Serbia to prevent the perpetration of this outrage. Unfortunately this did not lie within Serbia's power, as both assassins are Austrian subjects. Hitherto Serbia has been careful to suppress anarchic elements, and after recent events she will redouble her vigilance, and in the event of such elements existing within her borders will take the severest measures against them....'

*******

'Sir Edward Grey [British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs] to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.

Foreign Office, July 23, 1914.

' ... I could not help dwelling upon the awful consequences involved in the situation.... [I]t would be very desirable that those who had influence in St. Petersburgh should use it on behalf of patience and moderation.... [T]he amount of influence that could be used... would depend upon how reasonable were the Austrian demands and how strong the justification that Austria might have discovered for making her demands. The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as many as four Great Powers of Europe – let us
say, Austria, France, Russia, and Germany – were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money, and such an interference with trade, that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry. In these days, in great industrial States, this would mean a state of things worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who were victors in the war, many things might be completely swept away....'

*******

'Sir Edward Grey [British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs] to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

'Note addressed to Serbia, together with an explanation of the reasons leading up to it, has been communicated to me by [the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador] Count Mensdorff.

'In the ensuing conversation with his Excellency, I remarked that it seemed to me a matter for great regret that a time limit, and such a short one at that, had been insisted upon at this stage of the proceedings. The murder of the Archduke and some of the circumstances respecting Serbia quoted in the note aroused sympathy with Austria, as was natural, but at the same time I had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Serbia's independent sovereignty if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Serbia....'

*******

'Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey [British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs]. – (Received July 24.)

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 24, 1914.

' ... I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of His Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from His Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in Serbia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion....

'French Ambassador and M. Sazonof [Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs] both continued to press me for a declaration of complete solidarity of His Majesty's Government with French and Russian Governments, and I therefore said that it seemed to me possible that you might perhaps be willing to make strong representations to both German and Austrian Governments, urging upon them that an attack by Austria upon Serbia would endanger the whole peace of Europe. Perhaps you might see your way to saying to them that such action on the part of Austria would probably mean Russian intervention, which would involve France and Germany, and that it would be difficult for Great Britain to keep out if the war were to become general. M. Sazonof answered that we would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break out...'

*******

'Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d' Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey [British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs]. – (Received July 24.)

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 24, 1914.

'Austrian demands are considered absolutely unacceptable by Serbian Government, who earnestly trust that His Majesty's Government may see their way to induce Austrian Government to moderate them.

'This request was conveyed to me by Serbian Prime Minister, who returned early this morning to Belgrade. His Excellency is dejected, and is clearly very anxious as to developments that may arise.'

*******

'Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey [British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs]. – (Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 25, 1914.

' ... On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilising until you had had time to use your influence in favour of peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she would take no actions until it was forced upon her. Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present status quo in the Balkans, and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war....'

*******

'Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d' Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey [British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs]. – (Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

'The Council of Ministers is now drawing up their reply to the Austrian note. I am informed by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that it will be most conciliatory and will meet the Austrian demands in as large a measure as is possible.

'The following is a brief summary of the projected reply:–

'The Serbian Government consent to the publication of a declaration in the “Official Gazette.” The ten points are accepted with reservations. Serbian Government declare themselves ready to agree to a mixed commission of enquiry so long as the appointment of the commission can be shown to be in accordance with international usage. They consent to dismiss and prosecute those officers who can be clearly proved to be guilty, and they have already arrested the officer referred to in the Austrian note. They are prepared to suppress the Narodna Odbrana ['Defence of the People': a Serbian nationalist group].

'The Serbian Government consider that, unless the Austrian Government want war at any cost, they cannot but be content with the full satisfaction offered in the Serbian reply.'

*******

'Sir Edward Grey [British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs] to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

' ... The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian démarche makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will have mobilised against each other. In this event, the only chance of peace, in my opinion, is for the other four Powers to join in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the four Powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburgh to try and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view, I feel strongly that France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly co-operate....'

*******

'Reply of Serbian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note. – (Communicated by Serbian Minister, July 27.)

(Translation.)

' ... The Royal Government [of Serbia] also agree to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

'The Royal Government [of Serbia] must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Serbia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations....'

*******

'Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey [British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs]. – (Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 27, 1914.

'I have had conversations with all my colleagues representing the Great Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war with Serbia...'

*******

'Sir Edward Grey [British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs] to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

' ... The German Ambassador said the view of the German Government was that Austria could not by force be humiliated, and could not abdicate her position as a Great Power. I said I entirely agreed, but it was not a question of humiliating Austria, it was a question of how far Austria meant to push the humiliation of others....'

*******

'Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey [British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs]. – (Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, August 1, 1914.

' ... In the evening M. Sazonof [Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs] had an interview with the Austrian Ambassador who, not being definitely instructed by his Government, did his best to deflect the conversation towards a general discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia instead of keeping to the question of Serbia. In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his desire that these relations should remain friendly, and said that, taken in general, they were perfectly satisfactory; but the real question which they had to solve at this moment was whether Austria was to crush Serbia and to reduce her to the status of a vassal, or whether she was to leave Serbia a free and independent State....'