War 1914: Punishing the Serbs

Excerpts from official papers : –

'M.N. Pashitch, [Serbian] Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Royal Serbian Legations abroad.

Belgrade, June 18/July 1, 1914.

'The Austrian and Hungarian press are blaming Serbia more and more for the Sarajevo outrage. Their aim is transparent, viz., to destroy that high moral reputation which Serbia now enjoys in Europe, and to take the fullest advantage politically against Serbia of the act of a young and ill-balanced fanatic. But, in Serbia itself, the Sarajevo outrage has been most severely condemned in all circles of society, inasmuch as all, official as well as unofficial, immediately recognised that this outrage would be most prejudicial not only to our good neighbourly relations with Austria-Hungary but also to our co-nationalists in that country, as recent occurrences have proved. At a moment when Serbia is doing everything in her power to improve her relations with the neighbouring Monarchy, it is absurd to think that Serbia could have directly or indirectly inspired acts of this kind. On the contrary, it was of the greatest interest to Serbia to prevent the perpetration of this outrage. Unfortunately this did not lie within Serbia's power, as both assassins are Austrian subjects. Hitherto Serbia has been careful to suppress anarchic elements, and after recent events she will redouble her vigilance, and in the event of such elements existing within her borders will take the severest measures against them....'

*******

'Sir Edward Grey [British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs] to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.

Foreign Office, July 23, 1914.

' ... I could not help dwelling upon the awful consequences involved in the situation.... [I]t would be very desirable that those who had influence in St. Petersburgh should use it on behalf of patience and moderation.... [T]he amount of influence that could be used... would depend upon how reasonable were the Austrian demands and how strong the justification that Austria might have discovered for making her demands. The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as many as four Great Powers of Europe – let us say, Austria, France, Russia, and Germany – were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money, and such an interference with trade, that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry. In these days, in great industrial States, this would mean a state of things worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who were victors in the war, many things might be completely swept away....'

*******

'Sir Edward Grey [British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs] to Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 24, 1914.

'Note addressed to Serbia, together with an explanation of the reasons leading up to it, has been communicated to me by [the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador] Count Mensdorff.

'In the ensuing conversation with his Excellency, I remarked that it seemed to me a matter for great regret that a time limit, and such a short one at that, had been insisted upon at this stage of the proceedings. The murder of the Archduke and some of the circumstances respecting Serbia quoted in the note aroused sympathy with Austria, as was natural, but at the same time I had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Serbia's independent sovereignty if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Serbia....'

*******

'Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey [British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs]. – (Received July 24.)

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 24, 1914.

' ... I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what their Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of course, speak in the name of His Majesty's Government, but personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from His Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in Serbia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion....

'French Ambassador and M. Sazonof [Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs] both continued to press me for a declaration of complete solidarity of His Majesty's Government with French and Russian Governments, and I therefore said that it seemed to me possible that you might perhaps be willing to make strong representations to both German and Austrian Governments, urging upon them that an attack by Austria upon Serbia would endanger the whole peace of Europe. Perhaps you might see your way to saying to them that such action on the part of Austria would probably mean Russian intervention, which would involve France and Germany, and that it would be difficult for Great Britain to keep out if the war were to become general. M. Sazonof answered that we would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break out...'

*******

'Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d' Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey [British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs]. – (Received July 24.)

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 24, 1914.

'Austrian demands are considered absolutely unacceptable by Serbian Government, who earnestly trust that His Majesty's Government may see their way to induce Austrian Government to moderate them.

'This request was conveyed to me by Serbian Prime Minister, who returned early this morning to Belgrade. His Excellency is dejected, and is clearly very anxious as to developments that may arise.'

*******

'Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey [British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs]. – (Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 25, 1914.

' ... On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilising until you had had time to use your influence in favour of peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she would take no actions until it was forced upon her. Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present status quo in the Balkans, and establishing her own hegemony there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war....'

*******

'Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d' Affaires at Belgrade, to Sir Edward Grey [British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs]. – (Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) Belgrade, July 25, 1914.

'The Council of Ministers is now drawing up their reply to the Austrian note. I am informed by the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that it will be most conciliatory and will meet the Austrian demands in as large a measure as is possible.

'The following is a brief summary of the projected reply:–

'The Serbian Government consent to the publication of a declaration in the “Official Gazette.” The ten points are accepted with reservations. Serbian Government declare themselves ready to agree to a mixed commission of enquiry so long as the appointment of the commission can be shown to be in accordance with international usage. They consent to dismiss and prosecute those officers who can be clearly proved to be guilty, and they have already arrested the officer referred to in the Austrian note. They are prepared to suppress the Narodna Odbrana ['Defence of the People': a Serbian nationalist group].

'The Serbian Government consider that, unless the Austrian Government want war at any cost, they cannot but be content with the full satisfaction offered in the Serbian reply.'

*******

'Sir Edward Grey [British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs] to Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, July 25, 1914.

' ... The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian démarche makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time both Russia and Austria will have mobilised against each other. In this event, the only chance of peace, in my opinion, is for the other four Powers to join in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the four Powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburgh to try and arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view, I feel strongly that France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly co-operate....'

*******

'Reply of Serbian Government to Austro-Hungarian Note. – (Communicated by Serbian Minister, July 27.)

(Translation.)

' ... The Royal Government [of Serbia] also agree to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial enquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

'The Royal Government [of Serbia] must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Serbia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly relations....'

*******

'Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, to Sir Edward Grey [British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs]. – (Received July 27.)

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 27, 1914.

'I have had conversations with all my colleagues representing the Great Powers. The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war with Serbia...'

*******

'Sir Edward Grey [British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs] to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.

Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.

' ... The German Ambassador said the view of the German Government was that Austria could not by force be humiliated, and could not abdicate her position as a Great Power. I said I entirely agreed, but it was not a question of humiliating Austria, it was a question of how far Austria meant to push the humiliation of others....'

*******

'Sir G. Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to Sir Edward Grey [British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs]. – (Received August 2.)

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, August 1, 1914.

' ... In the evening M. Sazonof [Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs] had an interview with the Austrian Ambassador who, not being definitely instructed by his Government, did his best to deflect the conversation towards a general discussion of the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia instead of keeping to the question of Serbia. In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his desire that these relations should remain friendly, and said that, taken in general, they were perfectly satisfactory; but the real question which they had to solve at this moment was whether Austria was to crush Serbia and to reduce her to the status of a vassal, or whether she was to leave Serbia a free and independent State....'

The Vatican-Serbian Concordat, June 1914 (Part I)

(The above details of the Vatican-Serbian Concordat are taken from the Protestant Truth Society publication of 1918 entitled, Was Rome behind the War? [see the post on this blog from 28 November 2010 for excerpts from this work]. I haven't been able to find the details of this Concordat online - so by clicking on the above image to open it [and then by clicking on it again once opened with the magnifying glass cursor to enlarge it] I hope that a readable version is now available [Parts II & III can be found in posts below this one]).

Back in March 2010 on the World War Armageddon blog thread 'ARMAGEDDON: The Vatican Against Europe' I quoted the following from John Cornwell's Hitler's Pope: The Secret History of Pius XII :

'When Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife were gunned down by a pan-Serbian agitator in Sarajevo on June 28, [1914] the emotions prompted by the Serbian Concordat [signed between the Vatican and Serbia a few days earlier on June 24, 1914] became part of the general groundswell of anti-Serbian anger. The concordant nevertheless represented a contribution to the tensions that led the Austrian government to overplay its hand by delivering a humiliating ultimatum to Serbia. There is no indication that Pope Pius X grasped the role of the Holy See in adding to the pressures that brought the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Serbia to the brink. The declaration of war, it is said, threw him into a profound depression from which he never recovered. He died on August 20, 1914 – of a broken heart, it was said.'

(Hitler's Pope; American paperback edition – Penguin Books, 1999, 2000; pp. 57-58).

And I then went on to quote Count Carlo Sforza (the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Italy) from a chapter on 'The Origins of the [First World] War', from his work Contemporary Italy: Its Intellectual and Moral Origins (see the post 'Count Sforza, Pius X and 1914' from November 2010 on this blog, for the relevant portion from Count Sforza's work) in which he called the rumour of Pope Pius X succumbing to grief at his 'impotence to advert the disaster' of the war as: 'A legend more tenacious than history'; and then to, 'establish the truth as to that legend', he quoted extensively from one of the official letters (the dispatch of July 29, 1914 from Count Palffy, the Austrian Chargé d' Affaires at the Vatican to Count Berchtold) held within the diplomatic correspondence of the Austro-Hungarian Embassy – correspondence that Count Sforza himself had seen.

On 24 June 1914, it was Cardinal Merry del Val (the “Cardinal Secretary of State” at the Vatican) who signed the Concordat with Serbia on behalf of the Pope which gave the Holy See legal powers within the Kingdom of Serbia; the quote (from Count Sforza's work) below from the aforementioned dispatch from Count Palffy to Count Berchtold - from only one month after the signing of the Concordat - reveals Merry del Val's (and Pope “Saint” Pius X's) true sentiments concerning Serbia and the “war spirit” :

'“During the conversation I had two days ago with the Cardinal Secretary of State he spoke spontaneously of the great problems and questions now agitating Europe. It would be impossible to detect in His Eminence's words any spirit whatever of indulgence and conciliation. It is true he characterized the note to Serbia as very harsh, but he nevertheless approved it without any reservation and at the same time expressed, in an indirect way, the hope that the Monarchy would go to the limit. Certainly, added the Cardinal, it was too bad that Serbia had not been humiliated very much sooner, for then it might have been done without putting into play, as today, such immense possibilities. This declaration also corresponds to the Pope's way of thinking, for, in the course of recent years His Holiness has often expressed regret that Austro-Hungary has failed to 'chastise' her dangerous Danubian neighbour.

'“One might wonder for what motive the Catholic Church evinces herself so bellicose at an epoch when she is governed by a chief who is truly a saint, imbued with veritably apostolic ideas. The answer is very simple. The Pope and the Curia see in Serbia the ravaging malady that little by little penetrated the Monarchy to the marrow, and which, in time, would end by disintegrating it.

'“Despite all the other experiments attempted by the Curia in the course of the last decade, Austria-Hungary is and remains the Catholic State par excellence, the strongest rampart of the Faith which stands in our day for the Church of Christ. The fall of this rampart would signify for the Church the loss of its solidest prop; in the conflicts with the Orthodox Church she would see her most powerful champion struck down.

'“Hence, just as for Austria-Hungary there is an immediate necessity of self-preservation to expel from its organism, even by force if need be, the dissolving malady, there is also for the Catholic Church an indirect necessity of doing or approving everything that would serve to attain that end.

'“In this light, a harmony between the apostolic sentiment and the war spirit can easily be confirmed.”'

(ibid. Count Sforza; British edition, Frederick Muller Ltd., London, 1946; p. 154).

The Vatican-Serbian Concordat, June 1914 (Part II)

(The above details of the Vatican-Serbian Concordat are taken from the Protestant Truth Society publication of 1918 entitled, Was Rome behind the War? [see the post on this blog from 28 November 2010 for excerpts from this work]. I haven't been able to find the details of this Concordat online - so by clicking on the above image to open it [and then by clicking on it again once opened with the magnifying glass cursor to enlarge it] I hope that a readable version is now available [Part I can be found in a post above this; and Part III in a post below this one]).

The Vatican-Serbian Concordat, June 1914 (Part III)

(The above details of the Vatican-Serbian Concordat are taken from the Protestant Truth Society publication of 1918 entitled, Was Rome behind the War? [see the post on this blog from 28 November 2010 for excerpts from this work]. I haven't been able to find the details of this Concordat online - so by clicking on the above image to open it [and then by clicking on it again once opened with the magnifying glass cursor to enlarge it] I hope that a readable version is now available [Parts I & II can be found in posts above this one]).