I original attempted to have the post below submitted on Peter Hitchens' blog on the following thread: http://hitchensblog.mailonsunday.co.uk/2013/04/and-i-respond-to-mr-jacubss-response.html (there's normally only a 500-word limit to any post submitted on the Hitchensblog but there are exceptions made sometimes - I asked for an exception to the 500-word limit to be made - but was unsuccessful: so I publish what I tried to submit here instead:
[MODERATORS: Please see the request below]
Though initially perturbed by some of Peter Hitchens’ questioning
of the ‘standard narrative’ of the Second World War (though I’ve come to
different conclusions - which more strongly reinforce the views I did have) I’m
indeed grateful to him for his challenging views - as they’ve made me read a
lot deeper into the history of that
conflict than I had previously.
If it is permissible with the Moderators could they please
see if it is possible to allow the following submission (as it is impossible to
- in any way adequately - respond in this matter without recourse to quoting
from some historical works at length).
Peter Hitchens writes: ‘Germany did not seek war with us... Germany, whose ambitions lay in the east, had
little interest in us…. [T]he foolish
diplomatic bluff of the Polish guarantee failed to convince anyone (except the
Poles, who as a result failed to make a territorial compromise with Germany).’ In response to the above statement the following is taken from Gerhard L. Weinberg’s voluminous work on ‘Hitler’s Foreign Policy’:
‘It had originally not been part of Hitler’s plan to attack
Poland in 1939. After Munich, he intended to destroy what remained of
Czechoslovakia, but that was not expected to involve hostilities. His first war
was to be in the west, destroying France and crushing England so that they
could not interfere with his ambitions in Eastern Europe. Starting a war in the
west, however, meant making sure of quite in the east – just as the earlier
plan for an attack on Czechoslovakia had been accompanied by efforts to
neutralize the West. The plan to make certain that all was quiet on the eastern
front failed. The Hungarians fell into line, but the Poles simply would not do
so. From October 1938 on, the German government tried to entice, coax, overawe,
and bully the Poles into a position of subservience to Germany… As it became
clear to Hitler that the Poles were not willing to give up their status as an
independent country without a fight – and this rather than specific details of
German-Polish relations was the key issue – he reversed his planned sequence of
actions… He was now determined to fight Poland so that the total crushing of
Germany’s eastern neighbour would make it safe for Germany to attack in the
west. Here would be the lovely little war of which he had been cheated in
1938.’
(Gerhard L. Weinberg, ‘Hitler’s Foreign Policy 1933-1939:
The Road to World War II’, (originally published in two volumes) Enigma Books
(single volume edition), 2010, p. 801).
On p. 710-711 Weinberg quotes the Führer’s musings as given
to his military commanders on 22 August 1939 (from the text in Nuremberg
document 798-PS, TMWC, 26:338-39) as follows:
‘[I]t was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to
come sooner or later. I had already made this decision in the spring, but I
thought I would first turn against the West in a few years, and only afterwards
against the East. But the sequence could not be fixed…. I wanted to establish
an acceptable relationship with Poland in order to fight first against the
West. But this plan, which was agreeable to me, could not be executed since
essential points had changed. It became clear to me that Poland would attack us
in case of conflict with the West.’
Also, the following is from the blurb on the inside cover of
Esmonde M. Robertson’s ‘Hitler’s Pre-War Policy and Military Plans 1933-39’ (as
by ‘E. M Robertson’, Longmans, 1963):
‘[This book] has grown out of a monograph completed in the
Cabinet Office Historical Section and which was based principally on official
documents, the majority of which had not then been published….’
(During 1951-55 Mr Robertson was a Cabinet Office research
worker and had access to German military and diplomatic archives and whilst there
he also completed a monograph on Operation Barbarrossa – Hitler’s Invasion of
Russia.) But to continue from the blurb:
‘Two general conclusions can be drawn from the book. First,
that Mussolini had a much greater influence in stirring up the bellicose state
of mind in Hitler than is commonly supposed. Secondly, that there can be little
doubt that after November 1937 Hitler was planning a blow against Britain, not
Russia.’
Concerning war with Poland and Britain’s figuring in
Hitler’s thinking, Robertson writes:
‘After General Keitel had issued the directive of 11 April
for Operation White, German planning proceeded on two lines: operations for a
localized war against Poland; [and also] for a blockade against Britain. The
relation between these two theatres was discussed at length by Hitler at a
staff conference of 23 May.’
In these musings Hitler was certain that in the case of
Poland: ‘A repetition of the Czech affair was not to be expected. Hitler said
there “will be fighting”.’
[From footnote: ‘This passage has been misleadingly
translated “There will be war.” According to a Naval Directive of 16 May the
government was to do everything to restrict the war to Poland, ND [Nuremberg
Documents]: 126-C.’]
To continue back to the thrust of Robertson’s main text:
‘This does not mean that [Hitler] believed there would be a
general war, for he went on to say: “There must be no simultaneous conflict
with the Western Powers. Germany must not ‘slither’ into war on account of
Poland. Should such a conflict arise it would be better to attack in the West
and treat the Polish campaign as a subsidiary issue.” Hitler spoke at length on
operational conceptions, which had been maturing steadily since his conference
of 5 November 1937, for War with Britain. He discussed the relative merits of
an air attack on her fleet and a long distance blockade. He did not consider it
necessary to land forces in Britain, and he spoke gleefully of the time when
German expenditure need no longer be poured into the “bottomless pit” of the army
but could go into naval and air expansion. His natural preference for the
junior branches of the armed forces, which were capable of striking Britain,
rather than for the pedestrian and conservative army, may also have been an
additional inducement to plan for a war with Britain. At the end of the
conference it was decided that the years 1943-1944 were to be the new target
date for the completion of armaments. By that time the ship building programme
would have been complete. Although Hitler expressed his preference for a short
war, Germany would have to prepare for a long one of perhaps ten or fifteen
years.’ (ibid. p. 172-173).
Also, the following information is supplied in the footnotes
(p. 173):
‘There is abundant evidence on plans for war with Britain.
In March 1938 Raeder addressed German ship builders on a new naval construction
programme, ND: 23-C. In naval staff studies for April 1938, war with Britain
was taken for granted, and Blitzkrieg tactics for an attack on the British
fleet were discussed at an inter-service conference of 20 May 1938. While the
Air Force were in favour the Navy were against an occupation of the Low
Countries. The Naval High Command was, however, anxious to secure submarine
bases off the west coast of France and Norway. See Note on Sources, p. 195.
[Where he writes: ‘In accordance with official practice I am not permitted to
give the reference numbers of any documents as yet unpublished, with the result
that certain statements in my text are not provided with references to the
authorities which I have used’]. See also ND: 123-C and ND: 375-PS and Räder,
‘Mein Leben’, Vol. II, Chap XI.’
Concerning the ‘timing’ of the war that did break out in
September 1939: The following is taken from Richard Overy’s contribution
entitled “Hitler’s War Plans and the German Economy” (to be found in ‘Paths to
War: New Essays on the Origins of the Second World War’, edited by Robert Boyce
and Esmonde M. Robertson, and published by Macmillan, 1989):
‘The first stage [in Hitler’s war plans] was to create a
large, resource-rich area in central Europe, to be achieved without general
war. This was to be followed ‘by 1943-45’ by major war with the great powers in
order ‘to solve Germany’s problem of Lebenstraum’. Hitler’s strategic plan
foresaw a conflict for continental hegemony, and war with Russia for a Eurasian
empire. Beyond that lay imperial fantasies: world dominion, war with the United
States and the British Empire….’ (p. 107).
‘The new rearmament programmes only made sense in terms of a major war with other great powers; in the east to establish Lebensraum, and in the west, against Britain and the United States, in order to realise Germany's claim to world power status. The naval programme and the strategic bomber plans, including the Amerikabomber on which Messerschmitt began work in 1939, in addition to the range of advanced technological projects on which German research was engaged, all indicate clearly the drift of Hitler's strategy. The important question was one of timing. As Hitler indicated in November 1937, the major programmes would be completed by 1943-5. The air force plans would not be completed until 1942 at the earliest. The Z-Plan covered the whole period from 1939-49. The army motorisation and its training schedules for officers and technicians would run on to 1943. More important, the raw material programmes in oil, rubber, aluminium and iron and steel, including the incorporation of the captured resources of central Europe, would not be finished until the same date. The plans to modernise and strengthen the railway system, begun seriously only in 1939, would carry on until 1944. Had Germany enjoyed a further four or five years of peace, the military forces and economic resources available would have made her, like the Soviet Union and the United States, one of the military super powers of the 1940s.
‘Hitler's problem was to avoid a major conflict until these
programmes were complete, and it is here that his strategic competence and
political judgement proved seriously flawed. Until late in August 1939 he
expected that Britain and France would not fight for Poland.’ (p. 113).
And goes on to say that: ‘From the point of view of German
military and economic preparations, the war that broke out in the autumn of
1939 was the wrong war.’ (p. 121).
[Addenda:]
[Since writing the above I've since found the following additional items of interest in a couple of other works:
‘[Hitler] wanted to have the war at his supposedly most
favorable moment, while at the same time he failed to adequately prepare for
it. He regarded England as he once stressed, as “our enemy Number One,” while
at the same time hoping to come to an arrangement with that enemy.
‘I do not think that in those early days of September [1939],
Hitler was fully aware that he had irrevocably unleashed a world war. He had
merely meant to move one step further [in his planned sequence]. To be sure, he
was ready to accept the risk associated with that step, just as he had been a
year before during the Czech crisis; but he had prepared himself only for the
risk, not really for the great war. His naval rearmament was obviously planned
for a later date; the battleships as well as the first large aircraft carriers
were still under construction. He knew that they would not attain full military
value until they could face the enemy on more or less even terms. Moreover, he
had spoken so often of the neglect of the submarine arm in the First World War
that he probably would not have knowingly begun the Second without preparing a
strong fleet of U-boats.’
(Inside the Third Reich,
by Albert Speer, Phœnix Paperback edition, 2000; p. 239-40).
Concerning Hitler’s statement that England was Germany’s “enemy
Number One”; the following information is given by Speer in the Notes section:
‘On November 23, 1937, at the dedication of the Sonthofen Ordensberg
[Order Castle], tremendous cheers erupted when Hitler – after a speech that had
been received quietly – unexpectedly shouted to the assembled party leaders: “Our
Enemy Number One is England!” At the time I was astonished by the spontaneity
of this cheering. I was also surprised at Hitler's suddenly turning against
England, for I had assumed all along that England still held a special place in
his wishful thinking.’ (Ibid. P. 710).
And also the following which supports the above:
‘[T]he [German] navy's conception of preparing for a major
struggle by the mid-1940s was completely upturned when the Polish crisis led to
war between Germany and Great Britain in September 1939. In a remarkable
memorandum of 3 September 1939, the very date that Britain and France declared
war on Germany, the Commander-in-Chief of the navy, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder,
coming close to criticizing Hitler for taking Germany into war prematurely,
admitted that the navy, which according to the Z-Plan was arming for a war “on
the ocean” at the turn of the year 1944-5 was still in autumn 1939 nowhere near
sufficiently armed for the “great struggle with England”.
(From Ian Kershaw's, Fateful
Choices: Ten Decisions that Changed the World 1940-1941, Penguin Books,
2008; p. 72).]
