The Rise of Germany

From Winston S Churchill's, A History of the English-Speaking Peoples, Vol. 4, “The Great Democracies”; (Cassel & Company Ltd, 1958, 1974); “Book Twelve; Chapter Fifteen – The Rise of Germany” :

'In 1861 William I of Prussia ascended the throne of Frederick the Great, and marked the first years of his reign with three public appointments whose impact on European history and modern events is incalculable. Count von Moltke became Chief of the General Staff, Count von Roon Minister of War, and – most important of all – Count Otto von Bismarck was recalled from the Embassy in Paris to become Minister-President of Prussia. First as Chancellor of the North German Federation, and finally of the German Empire, this singular genius presided with a cold passion over the unification and Prussianisation of Germany, the elimination of Prussia's nearest European rivals, and the elevation of William to the German Emperor's throne in 1871. . . .

'Absolute monarchy was [Bismarck's] ideal and aim. Liberalism and Parliamentarianism were anathema [to him]. [He believed that] Prussia must be purged of weak and liberal elements so that she could fulfil her destiny of leading and controlling the German-speaking peoples. A decisive struggle with Austria was [therefore] inevitable.

'Before a background of intense, brilliant, and unscrupulous diplomatic activity the three hammer-blows that forged Germany were deliberately prepared and struck. These were the war with Denmark in 1864, by which the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein were attached to Prussia, the Seven Weeks' War of 1866, in which Austria was crushed and her associates in Germany overrun, and as culmination the war against France in 1870.' (pp. 207-208)

'Britain played no effective part in this affair. Palmerston would have liked to intervene, for Britain had guaranteed the integrity of Denmark by the Treaty of Berlin in 1852, which he himself had helped to negotiate. Before the blow fell he had said in the House of Commons: “We are convinced – I am convinced at least – that if any violent attempt were made to overthrow [Danish] rights and interfere with that independence those who made the attempt would find in the result that it would not be Denmark alone with which they would have to contend.” But the Cabinet was hesitant and divided and was not prepared to back these imprecise assurances. . . . [Under these circumstances, and in the reluctance of any of the other European Powers to involve themselves on the side of the Danes in the dispute] Palmerston felt he could do no more than press for conferences and mediation. It is not the only time in British history when strength has been lacking to reinforce bold words. Palmerston's words had given the Danes a false sense of security and tempted them to obduracy in an argument where legality did not entirely lie on their side, though some justice did. An ominous precedent was thus set for what the Germans politely called Realpolitik, while Britain and France looked on. Realpolitik meant that standards of morality in international affairs could be ignored whenever material advantage might be gained.' (p. 209)

In Two Years After and Onwards, or The Approaching War Amongst the Powers of Europe, (published the same year as the Dano-Germanic war of 1864) the works' Author, David Pae, wrote the following concerning the position then taken by Britain in that conflict:

'The course she did take, in not rendering material aid to Denmark, was the right course, though naturally her sympathies lay on the side of the weak and ill-used power. But the course of neutrality she adopted was consistent with her policy in regard to Poland and Italy. The claims of Denmark were not greater than the claims of those other countries; but Britain, being the guardian of universal, and not sectional liberty, kept neutral towards all.' (p. 93)

And he was of the opinion that in the predicted 'universal war' to come, that it would be in the best interests of Britain to remain neutral – to 'husband her strength and resources' – up until such time as she would need to intervene in Palestine, and the Near East, to safeguard the overland route to her 'Eastern [Indian] possessions'.

John Charmley, the British historian who specialises in modern diplomatic and political history, in the Introduction to his work, Splendid Isolation? Britain, the Balance of Power and the Origins of the First World War (1999), writes:

'One strand in the 'inevitability' argument is the belief that Britain had a role to play in maintaining the balance of power in Europe and that this 'traditional' policy was being fulfilled in 1914 and 1939. Neville Chamberlain is assaulted for not following this tradition. Yet where was this 'tradition' between 1815 and 1914, or between 1714 and 1793 for that matter?

'This book dissents from the view that there was such a traditional foreign policy, and therefore from the opinion that the British involvement in the war of 1914 was inevitable; it dissents, by implication, from the view that British participation was desirable. Just before this book begins in 1874, the Germans had defeated the French. The skies had not fallen in and civilisation had not ended; nor would it have done in 1914 had the German once more defeated the French.'

But returning back to Churchill's work, and the actual events of history – Churchill continues:

'The outcome of the war with Denmark was soon to furnish the pretext and occasion for the next and far more important step of eliminating Austria from the German Confederation [(in the Seven Weeks' War of 1866), and therefore ensuring Prussian hegemony] . . . Schleswig and Holstein had [on annexation] become a condominium of Prussia and Austria. Bismarck played upon the awkwardness of this arrangement, maintaining a screen of protests against the indignant but long-suffering Austrians [whist seeking the support of the other Continental Powers]. . . .

'The stage was set. . . . Within ten days of the outbreak of war Hanover, Hesse, and Saxony were occupied. The King of Hanover, grandson of George III, fled to England and his country was incorporated in Prussia. Thus disappeared the ancient Electorate which had given Britain her Protestant dynasty in 1714. . . .

'Three weeks later the Prussians were within reach of Vienna. At Bismarck's vehement insistence the capital was spared the humiliation of occupation and the peace terms were once again lenient. Bismarck's mind was already turned to his next move, and he set store by future Austrian friendship. “So to limit a victory,” he said, “is not only generous but a most wise policy. But for the victor to benefit from it the recipient must be worthy.” Austria's only territorial loss was Venetia, granted to Italy, but she was finally excluded from Germany and her future ambitions had inevitably to lie south-eastwards among the Slavs. So ended the Seven Weeks' War. . . . The balance of Continental power had changed radically. A premonitory shudder went through France . . . .' (pp. 210, 212)